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Abstract
This paper provides the first empirical evidence of the scale, the determinants, and the
information content of short selling activities in exchange-traded funds (ETFs). Short
sellers use ETFs as an avenue to circumvent short-sale constraints at the stock level,
and the shorting activity on ETFs rises with the difficulty of shorting the underlying
stocks. ETF shorting activities are informative of the future returns of underlying
stocks: stocks that are heavily shorted via their holding ETFs underperform those
lightly shorted by 94 basis points per month. The return predictability of ETF short
selling on individual stocks is distinct from stock-level shorting measures, and is con-
centrated among stocks that face the most severe arbitrage constraints. Our evidence
suggests that ETFs contribute to a more informationally efficient market by allowing
arbitrageurs to target overpriced stocks that are otherwise difficult to short.
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“If you are going short, you are looking for liquidity.”
- James Ross, State Street Global Advisors, The Institutional ETF Toolbox, p.68
The market for exchange-traded funds (ETFs) has been growing exponentially during the
recent decade. At the end of 2015, there were 1,594 ETFs managing $2.1 trillion in the U.S.
market, up from 201 ETFs managing $296 billion in 20051. Most ETFs are structured as
open-ended investment companies and are traded on stock exchanges intraday. Usually, an
ETF tracks a particular stock or bond index by physically holding all constituent securities
(or a sample of them) as its underlying assets2. As an investment vehicle, ETFs provide
investors with a cost-efficient way to passively manage their assets. This cost reduction
derives in large part from the fact that by pooling securities together, ETFs are able to
reduce asymmetric information, lower transaction costs, and enhance liquidity (Madhavan
(2014)). At the same time, academics and practitioners share their misgivings that the rise of
ETFs increases underlying stock volatility, propagates shocks across their constituents (Ben-
David, Franzoni, and Moussawi (2012); Da and Shive (2012)), and may have contributed to
the Flash Crash of May 2010 (Madhavan (2012)).
An important aspect of ETFs that has been largely unexamined is their short selling activ-
ities. Just as other exchange-traded securities, ETFs can be sold short as well. Many traders
use ETF short sales to hedge market or sector exposures and to manage risks (Gastineau
(2010)). Other market participants argue that ETFs provide a more cost-effective avenue to
gain negative exposures to certain underlying stocks. While we detail the advantages of ETF
short selling in the next section, it is evident that the short selling activities of ETF products
are highly active.3 Figure 1 shows the aggregate level of ETF short interest compared to the
size of the ETF market in our sample. The dollar value of ETF short selling exceeded $80
billion multiple times in our sample period, and it represents 10–40% of their corresponding
ETFs’ market capitalization. For comparison, the dollar amount of short interests of US
12016 Investment Company Yearbook
2A small fraction of ETFs track their indices using swaps or other derivatives. They are out of the scope
of our research in this paper.
3During our sample period, 3.9% of equity ETFs have average short interest ratios above 20% and 10.64%
have average short interest ratios above 10% of shares outstanding. For stocks, the corresponding figures
are 0.92% and 5.46%, respectively.
equity on average is about 4% of their market capitalization. To the best of our knowledge,
this paper is the first in the literature to systematically examine the scope, the determinants,
and the implications of ETF short selling activities.
What drives ETF short selling activities? Firstly, some traders may use ETF shorting to
hedge the risks borne by their long positions (“hedging”). Secondly, some traders may want
to bet against the future returns of the whole market, certain styles, or certain sectors (“sector
betting”). A third motivation that is related but different from sector betting is “synthetic
shorting” using ETFs. In this case, some traders want to bet against a subset of stocks
held by the ETF, but are unable to short those stocks directly. We argue that ETF short
selling alleviates short-sale constraints for certain stocks that are otherwise hard to borrow.
In a sense, ETF short selling and the short selling of its constituents are partial substitutes.
Traders can put up a shorting position for a specific stock by shorting the ETF and hedging
other stock constituents. In this paper, we term such combination trading strategy synthetic
shorting with ETFs and we hypothesize that such a strategy is an important driver of ETF
short selling activities.
Accounts by market participants corroborate this conjecture: For example, MarketWatch
reports that “One hedge fund with which Weinhoffer is familiar was struggling to borrow
a stock and instead shorted an ETF that contained the shares, ... The manager then took
long positions in all the other stocks in the ETF”4. Barron’s recently runs a column piece
titled exactly as “Synthetic Shorting with ETFs”5. It points out that hedge funds frequently
create synthetic shorting using ETFs, particularly when it is costly or outright impossible
to borrow the target stock(s). In addition, some hedge funds prefer using ETFs to short
underlying stocks so that their rivals cannot easily detect their strategies.
Our empirical analysis suggests that the ETF short ratio is high when the demand for
shorting the underlying stocks is high, when the lending supply of underlying shares is low,
and when the cost of shorting the underlying stocks is high. When we proxy the level of
short-sale constraint of constituent stocks using idiosyncratic volatility and Amihud (2002)
illiquidity measure, we find that ETF short selling is more active when the underlying stocks
4“More equity hedge funds turn to shorting ETFs”, MarketWatch, June 1, 2007
5“Synthetic Shorting with ETFs”, Crystal Kim, Barron’s, Feb 27, 2017
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are less liquid or more volatile.6 We also use the Regulation SHO Pilot Program as a quasi-
natural experiment, since it reduces the friction in shorting stocks directly. Stocks that
were randomly selected into the Pilot Program became less difficult to short directly, and
subsequently receive less short selling from their holding ETFs. Put together, these results
lend credence to our claim that market participants use ETF short selling to effectively short
underlying stocks, especially when the underlying stocks are difficult to short.
If market participants are actively using ETF shorting as an avenue to circumvent short-
ing constraints, does ETF short selling have predictive power over the future return of the
ETFs and their underlying stocks? The answer is yes. We find a significant predictive re-
lation at the ETF level and an even stronger relation at the stock level. The higher the
ETF short ratio, the lower the future ETF and stock returns. This is consistent with our
understanding of why traders short ETFs: While some of the traders have a bearish view
on the ETF as a whole, many of them effectively use ETFs to short a subset of constituent
stocks. A short position in ETF and long positions in some constituents is equivalent to a
“synthetic” short position in other constituent stocks of the ETF. Therefore, one would be
able to more reliably glean information from ETF shorting activities by aggregating ETF
short interests to the stock level. Stocks that lie in the intersection of several highly shorted
ETFs are more likely to be the true targets of ETF short bets.
One of the key innovations of our paper is that we construct a short ratio for each
stock from the short interests of all ETFs holding that particular stock. This measure,
which we call the ETF-based short ratio, reflects the collective shorting demand of that
stock through short selling ETFs. We find that the ETF-based short ratio strongly forecasts
future returns, even after controlling for stock-level shorting activities. An equal-weighted,
monthly rebalanced, long-short strategy that sells the decile of stocks that are most heavily
shorted via their holding ETFs and buys the decile of stocks that are the most lightly shorted
earns 94 basis points per month (t-stat = 3.21) after adjusting for the Carhart (1997) four
factors. A similar strategy with value weights earns an abnormal return of 77 bp per month
(t-stat = 2.47). Adjusting the recently proposed factor models–the Fama and French (2016)
6In sharp constrast, short selling on stocks is more active when stock is more liquid and less volatile. See
Table 2 of Hong, Li, Ni, Scheinkman, and Yan (2015) for evidence.
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five-factor model, the Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2015) q-theory model, or the Stambaugh and
Yuan (2015) mispricing factor model–does not change the return spread of the long/short
portfolio much; if anything, the adjustments increase the spread. Our strategy return is
virtually unchanged after adjusting for the stock lending fees for both the long and short
legs, suggesting that the abnormal return obtained by this strategy is not merely an artifact
of the high lending cost of heavily shorted stocks. Rather, there is some degree of market
inefficiency such that the information contained in the ETF shorting market is not fully
incorporated by the stock market.
When we double-sort stocks first by proxies of short-sale constraints and then by their
ETF-based short ratio, we find that the return predictability of the ETF-based short ratio
is concentrated within the group of stocks that are lightly-shorted at stock-level and are
subject to greater impediments to arbitrage. Our proxies for arbitrage frictions include
institutional ownership, lendable supply and lending fee from Markit, idiosyncratic volatility,
and turnover. For example, the Carhart (1997) 4-factor alpha based on the ETF short ratio
is a monthly 1.20% (t=3.59) in the tercile with lowest institutional ownership, while it is only
0.25% (t=1.51) for stocks with high institutional ownership. In the same vein, the predictive
power of the ETF-based short ratio is more pronounced for stocks that have a low lending
supply, high borrowing cost, high idiosyncratic volatility, and low trading volume. This is
strong evidence that ETF short selling works as an alleviation mechanism for hard-to-short
stocks.
In a Fama–MacBeth regression setting, we confirm that the ETF-based short ratio has
additional explanatory power for future stock returns when we control for the stock-level
shorting variables. Consistent with the literature, we find that both shorting demand and
cost measures at the stock level strongly forecast future returns. Stocks that have a high
short interest ratio or high shorting costs underperform other stocks. Importantly, the
predictive power of the ETF-based short ratio is comparable in economic significance to these
well-studied stock-level shorting activity measures. For example, a one standard deviation
increase in ETF-based short ratio is associated with a lower future monthly return of 15 basis
points, while a one standard deviation increase in stock short ratio decreases future return
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by 20 basis points. The return predictability of our ETF-based short ratio cannot be fully
explained by betting on sector-level information, as it also predicts industry-adjusted excess
stock return. In sub-period analysis, we find the return predictability of ETF-based short
ratio is three times stronger in the second half of our sample, consistent with the increasing
importance of ETF market over time.
Our final set of tests explore the implication of ETF short selling on capital market
anomalies. Since many argue that short sale constraints are important drivers of anomalies
and ETF short selling alleviates such constraints, we expect that stocks with high ETF
ownership would be priced more efficiently. Across 10 well-studied capital market anomalies,
six have significantly attenuated return spreads when ETF ownership is high as compared to
when ETF ownership is low. The evidence supports our conclusion that ETFs contribute to a
more informationally efficient stock market, at least with respect to correcting overvaluation
induced by short-sale constraints.
This paper contributes to several strands of the literature. First, it extends a large
literature that exmaines the information content of the short interest ratio. Numerous studies
document that a stock’s short ratio is a strong contrarian predictor of future returns.7 The
common interpretation is that when investors have divergence of opinions and short-sale
constraints are binding, the value of the stocks will only reflect the optimists’ view, hence
they are more likely to be overvalued (Miller (1977)).8 Short interest is a proxy for the
amount of negative information excluded from the market price (Figlewski (1981)). Different
from the previous literature, our paper considers the information contained in ETF short
interest for future stock returns. As pointed out by Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002), short
interest could be a poor proxy for the degree of overvaluation, as variation across stocks in
short interest could be driven by both supply and demand for short selling. A stock with
low or zero short interest could be extremely difficult to short, which should translate into
more overpricing, not less. Consistent with this intuition, we document that the ETF-based
7See for example, Figlewski (1981), Dechow, Hutton, Meulbroek, and Sloan (2001), Desai, Ramesh,
Thiagarajan, and Balachandran (2002), Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter (2005), Boehme, Danielsen, and Sorescu
(2006), Cohen, Diether, and Malloy (2007), among others.
8A large literature explores the effects of heterogeneous beliefs on equilibrium asset prices when short-
selling is constrained. e.g. Harrison and Kreps (1978), Scheinkman and Xiong (2003), Hong, Scheinkman,
and Xiong (2006) and Duffie, Garleanu, and Pedersen (2002).
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short ratio contains incremental predictability for stock returns even after controlling for
the stock’s own short ratio, especially among those most constrained by the availability of
lendable shares.
A second related literature documents that frictions in the equity lending market is the
key impediment to informational arbitrage and causes the persistence of several well-known
asset pricing anomalies. Using institutional ownership as a proxy for lendable supply, Nagel
(2005) finds that returns to a set of anomalies are concentrated among stocks with low in-
stitutional ownership. Hirshleifer, Teoh, and Yu (2011) document similar findings for the
accrual anomaly. Using investor sentiment as a signal of overpricing, Stambaugh, Yu, and
Yuan (2012) document that returns to 11 anomalies largely come from the short leg and
are more pronounced following a high sentiment period, which suggests that impediments
to short selling play a key role in explaining anomalies. With high-quality security lending
data from Markit becoming available, several recent papers examine the effect of actual lend-
able supply (Beneish, Lee, and Nichols (2015)) or borrowing costs (Drechsler and Drechsler
(2014)) on anomalies. Our paper is related to these studies in the sense that we docu-
ment that ETF short selling works as an alleviation mechanism for stock-level short-sale
constraints and attenuates cross-sectional mispricing, especially for stocks that are costly to
short in the first place.
Our paper also contributes to the emerging literature that examines the effect of ETF
investing on the stock market. Several papers document the dark side of ETF investing
as non-fundamental demand shocks might transmit from the ETFs to their underlying se-
curities. Theoretically, Bhattacharya and O’Hara (2015) show that information feedback
between ETFs and underlyings could cause propagation of shocks unrelated to fundamen-
tals and market instability, especially for ETFs track hard-to-trade assets. Empirically,
Ben-David, Franzoni, and Moussawi (2012) provide evidence that arbitrage activities be-
tween ETFs and their underlying stocks increase the volatility of their underlying assets.
Da and Shive (2012) document that higher ETF trading activity leads to excess return co-
movement among the constituent stocks. Israeli, Lee, and Sridharan (2015) examine the
effect of ETFs on the underlying assets from an information perspective. They find that
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an increase in ETF ownership is accompanied by a decline in pricing efficiency for the un-
derlying component securities. Using data from a large German brokerage, Bhattacharya,
Loos, Meyer, and Hackethal (2014) find that individuals investing in passive ETFs do not
improve their portfolio performance, due to poor ETF timing and selection. On the bright
side, Boehmer and Boehmer (2003) find the initiation of three ETFs increased liquidity and
market quality. Glosten, Nallareddy, and Zou (2015) document that ETF trading increases
informational efficiency for stocks with weak information environments. Dannhauser (2016)
finds that corporate bond ETFs have a long-term positive valuation effect in its underly-
ings. By highlighting that one benefit of ETFs is to facilitate short selling on overvalued
underlying stocks, our paper contributes to the growing debate on the consequences of index
investing on the stock market.
Options and equity futures are also alternative avenues for traders to get around short-
sale constraints. Danielsen and Sorescu (2001) finds that option listing could help mitigate
short-sale constraints and reduce mispricing, while Danielsen, Van Ness, and Warr (2009)
documents similar effect for the introduction of single-stock futures. Johnson and So (2012)
argues that equity short-sale costs lead informed agents to trade options more frequently for
negative signals than positive ones, thus predicting a negative relation between option-to-
stock volume ratio and future stock return. In this paper, we find the return predictability of
ETF short selling on individual stocks is greatly amplified among those without exchange-
traded put option, thus suggesting ETF short selling works as complementary to these
alternative shorting channels.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1 details the institutional back-
ground of ETF shorting selling and compares it to stock-level short selling. Section 2 de-
scribes the various data we used in the analysis and presents summary statistics. Section 3
examines the cross-sectional determinants of ETF short interest and the return predictabil-
ity of ETF short interest at the ETF level. In Section 4, we examine the predictability of
ETF short selling for cross-sectional stock returns. Section 5 examines the consequences of
rising ETF ownership on capital market anomalies. Section 6 concludes.
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1 Institutional Background
ETF short selling is prevalent despite its lack of attention from media and common investors.
Leading practitioner books, such as Gastineau (2010), claim that “‘[s]hort selling in the ETF
marketplace is a large part of ETF trading volume, and ETF short positions are often so
large relative to total ETF shares outstanding”. Indeed, the most heavily shorted ETFs often
have short ratios that are higher than 100%9. Moreover, some traders use short positions in
an ETF and long positions in all but few of its constituent stocks to establish a “synthetic”
short position in a few target stocks, because the stocks in question are difficult to borrow.
How is ETF short selling different from stock short selling? What are the advantages of
shorting ETFs relative to stocks? In this section, we provide some institutional background
to this under-studied trading practice.
1.1 The “Create-to-Lend” Mechanism
When a trader attempts to short sell ETF shares, there are two routes to take: She can
ask her broker to borrow ETF shares directly from institutional investors or brokerage firms
with lending programs. Alternatively, the broker can borrow or purchase10 the underlying
securities, turn them to an Authorized Participant (AP), then let the AP create new units of
the ETF so that the broker can lend these shares to the short seller. This mechanism uses the
creation–redemption feature of ETFs and is dubbed “create-to-lend.” In creating new units,
APs sometimes only need to deliver a representative sample of all stocks that the ETF holds.
Although it is unclear how much deviation is allowed between the submitted creation basket
of securities and the actual ETF underlying holdings, this mechanism potentially opens the
door for easier access to shorting the ETF as opposed to shorting specific hard-to-borrow
assets.
Some empirical evidence suggests the create-to-lend mechanism is an important avenue
for ETF short selling. For example, the average total short interest of the S&P500 Spider
ETF is greater than the average lendable supply, suggesting that some fraction of short sell-
9Many industry websites, such as https://www.etfchannel.com/type/most-shorted-etfs/, continuously
track the most heavily shorted ETFs.
10The broker would have to hedge her position by short selling the securities herself.
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ing is borrowed through creation (Karmaziene and Sokolovski (2015)). Since ETF providers
are often active participants in securities lending markets, they are usually able to locate un-
derlying securities for borrowing. Asquith and Meulbroek (1995) and Danielsen and Sorescu
(2001) cite several reasons why ”ordinary” investors might face higher transaction costs in
trying to establish short positions than brokers. The differential search costs in lending
markets between prime brokers and traders is likely an important advantage for ETF short
selling.11
The create-to-lend mechanism also makes ETF short selling difficult to be squeezed. In
order to short squeeze an ETF, one must not only buy the shares of the ETF, but also
deplete the lending supply of underlying stocks. Otherwise, short sellers could simply create
additional ETF shares to answer the call. ETF short squeezes are “virtually unknown”
(Gastineau (2010)).
1.2 Other Advantages of ETF Short Selling
There are several important advantages for short selling via ETFs. First of all, ETF
securities are usually more liquid than their underlying individual stocks. They are traded
more frequently, have smaller bid-ask spread, and have shorter days-to-cover. Hong, Li,
Ni, Scheinkman, and Yan (2015) argue that days-to-cover (DTC), defined as open short
interest divided by average daily trading volume, is an important measure for the crowdness
of short sale trades. In a sense, it captures how fast arbitrageurs are able to exit their short
trades. In our sample, the average days-to-cover for ETFs is about 2 days (Table 1). This is
significantly shorter than the average DTC for stocks (6.5 days in our sample period). Even
for the ETFs in the highest short-ratio quintile, the average DTC is a little longer than 6
days (the number is 19 days for most shorted quintile of stocks). This means that short
sellers would be able to cover their positions in reasonable speed and at reasonable costs
should the market conditions turn against them. The short days-to-cover is an attractive
feature for ETF short selling especially when short trades are getting crowded in the recent
decade (Hanson and Sunderam (2014)).
11Using the stock lending market data from Brazil, Chague, De-Losso, De Genaro, and Giovannetti (2017)
find that well-connected borrowers pay lower lending fee, even for the same stock at the same day.
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Secondly, ETFs are also more lightly regulated in terms of short selling than using eq-
uities. Unlike stocks, ETFs have never been subject to an “uptick” rule. The uptick rule
dictates that a short order must be placed above the last transaction price, or the “uptick.”
This rule has been shown to impede short selling activities ( Alexander and Peterson (2008);
Diether, Lee, and Werner (2009a)). The fact that ETFs are not subject to the uptick rule
allows traders to implement more flexible trading strategies using ETFs to form synthetic
short positions on the constituent stocks. During the 2008 Financial Crisis, the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) temporarily banned short sales in 797 financial stocks,
but this ban list did not include any ETFs. Many market participants, as suggested by
Karmaziene and Sokolovski (2015), circumvented the ban by short selling financial-sector
ETFs instead.
Finally, ETF shorting provides some secrecy in a shorting environment that is increasingly
crowded. It is difficult to detect the true shorting target from a synthetic strategy involving
shorting an ETF. Such a strategy is advantageous both for avoiding a short squeeze and for
minimizing the costs of borrowing.
1.3 Synthetic Shorting with ETFs
Given the features of ETF short selling discussed in the previous subsections, we argue
that some short sellers would use ETFs to create “synthetic” short positions instead of
directly shorting individual names. In order to do so, the trader would short the ETF
that contains the target stocks, and enter long positions in all of or a sample of the ETF’s
underlying stocks that are not the targets. If the ETF is value weighted, a buy-and-hold
synthetic shorting strategy would inversely track the performance of the target stocks.
In evaluating the synthetic shorting strategy against direct shorting, the short seller must
trade off the benefits and costs of shorting via ETFs. The most direct cost is the lending
fee for borrowing ETF shares. When we compare the average lending cost score (DCBS in
Markit dataset) for stocks and ETFs in our sample, the lending costs are roughly the same.
This cost is partially offset by the management expense of the ETFs, which average about
44 basis points per annum. Another important source of costs are the transaction costs of
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entering the long positions of the synthetic shorting strategy. Since an ETF typically has
hundreds of underlying stocks, establishing long positions in all but a few stocks can incur
a non-trivial amount of transaction costs for the trader.12 On the other hand, if the short
seller does not fully hedge, she bears the risk of price movement of the ETF itself. Should
the ETF unexpectedly appreciate, the short seller would suffer losses.
The static lending cost, however, may not the only concern for short sellers. Engelberg,
Reed, and Ringgenberg (2014) point out that an important consideration for short sellers is
the risk of loan being called and, conditional on being called, whether the lending cost spikes
at the inopportune moment. In the data, the distribution of stock-level lending cost score
is skewed to the right, both unconditionally and within-stock. In contrast, the distribution
of ETF lending cost score is less skewed, suggesting less risks involving shorting ETFs.
Moreover, since the stock lending market is highly fragmented and the stock-level lending
cost data come from transactions where the short seller and the lender are successfully
matched, it is possible that the observed lending cost is an under-estimation of the true
lending cost. When a stock is highly difficult to short, supply is extremely limited and the
intended short sellers fail to short the stock. In such cases, more liquid ETF shorting market
can be the only alternative outlet for carrying out the short trade (see the anecdote described
in the Introduction section).
2 Data and Summary Statistics
2.1 Sample Construction
Our sample contains all U.S. domestic equity ETFs that physically replicate their indices.13
To obtain a list of such ETFs, we start by intersecting all funds in the CRSP mutual fund
database with ETF designation (etf flag=F) with securities in CRSP monthly stock file
with share code of 73. We then manually filter out non-domestic or non-equity ETFs by
12A recent paper by Frazzini, Israel, and Moskowitz (2012) estimate that the actual trading costs faced
by real-world arbitrageurs are an order of magnitude smaller than previous studies suggest. The mean
transaction costs are about 11 bp and 21 bp in large cap and small cap stocks, respectively.
13Most ETFs in the U.S tend to physically replicate their underlying index. The Investment Act of 1940
requires ETFs to hold 80% of their assets in securities matching the fund’s name.
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parsing the fund name14. To ensure that the ETFs in our sample physically replicate the
indices instead of using derivatives, we further require that they have holdings information
for at least 20 stocks from the Thomson Reuters Mutual Fund holdings database (S12). Our
sample contains 343 ETFs from 2002 to 201315.
Monthly short interest series of both ETFs and stocks comes from Compustat. Each
month, U.S. exchanges report the level of short interest on the 15th of each month16. To
form the short interest ratio (SR), we normalize short interest by total shares outstanding
from CRSP. We obtain stock lending supply (lendable shares divided by shares outstand-
ing), the stock lending utilization ratio,17 and stock lending fees from the Markit Securities
Finance (formerly Data Explorer) database. Markit provides two variables that proxy for
stock lending cost. The first variable, SAF, is the simple average fees of stock borrowing
transactions from hedge funds in a given security, which is the difference between the risk-
free rate and the rebate rate. SAF is only available for a stock to the extent that the stock
is being shorted by a Markit client hedge fund. The second variable, DCBS (Daily Cost of
Borrowing Score), which covers all stocks, is a score from 1 to 10 created by Markit using
their proprietary information. This score is intended to capture the cost of borrowing the
stock: A score of 1 represents the cheapest to short and 10 represents the most difficult. The
SAF variable is available after November 2006, while the DCBS variable is available after
October 2003.18
We obtain monthly stock returns from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP)
and annual accounting data from Compustat. Our sample of stocks starts with all common
stocks traded on NYSE, Amex, and NASDAQ. We adjust the stock returns by delisting. If
a delisting return is missing and the delisting is performance-related, we set the delisting
return to be -30% (Shumway (1997)).
14We search for terms in fund names such as “International”, “World”, “Ex-US”, “Treasury”, or “Munic-
ipal”.
15Glosten, Nallareddy, and Zou (2015) reports a sample of 447 ETFs between 2004 to 2013. The discrep-
ancy is mainly attributed to our requirement for ETFs to have short interest data from Compustat.
16After September 2007, short interest data are reported twice each month and we keep the last report of
each month. Our results are not materially affected if we use mid-month report throughout our sample.
17Defined as shares on loan divided by lendable shares, both from Markit survey participants.
18See Saffi and Sigurdsson (2011) and Beneish, Lee, and Nichols (2015) for a detailed account of Markit
equity lending database.
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We use standard control variables in our empirical analysis. Size (LnME) is defined as the
natural logarithm of market capitalization at the end of June in each year. Book-to-market
ratio (LnBM) equals to the most recent fiscal year-end report of book value divided by the
market capitalization at the end of calendar year t-1. Book value equals the value of common
stockholders’ equity, plus deferred taxes and investment tax credits, minus the book value
of preferred stock. Momentum (Mom) is defined as the cumulative holding-period return
from month t-12 and t-2. We follow the literature by skipping the most recent month’s
return when constructing the Momentum variable. The short term reversal measure (REV)
is the prior month’s return. Turnover is the daily trading volume over shares outstanding,
averaged within a month. Since the dealer nature of the NASDAQ market makes its turnover
difficult to compare with the turnover observed on NYSE and AMEX, we follow Gao and
Ritter (2010) by adjusting trading volume for NASDAQ stocks.19 Institutional ownership
(IO) is the sum of shares held by institutions from 13F filings in each quarter divided by total
shares outstanding. Idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL) is the standard deviation of the residuals
from the regression of daily stock excess returns on Fama and French (1993) 3-factor returns
within a month (Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006)). Institutional ownership data of
stocks are available from Thomson Reuters (formerly CDA/Spectrum) Institutional Holdings
database (13F). Option data are from Option Metrics.
2.2 ETF Characteristics
ETFs are characterized by both ETF-level variables and the weighted-average characteristics
of their underlying stocks. At the ETF level, our focus is the short ratio of the ETF, defined
as open short interests divided by shares outstanding of the ETF. We are also interested in
an ETF’s market capitalization (CRSP Price * Shares Outstanding), turnover ratio (CRSP
Volume/Shares Outstanding), past 12-month return, return volatility, and expense ratio. We
calculate the “premium” of ETFs relative to their underlying stocks as the difference between
19Specifically, we divide NASDAQ volume by 2.0, 1.8, 1.6, and 1.0 for the periods before February 2001,
between February 2001 and December 2001, between January 2002 and December 2003, and after January
2004, respectively.
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month-end price of an ETF and its NAV as a fraction of the NAV20. As for the underlying
stocks, we aggregate the stock idiosyncratic volatility, market capitalization, book-to-market
ratio, short ratio, institutional ownership, lendable supply, lending utilization, lending cost
(DCBS score), and Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure by using a weighted average of these
characteristics at the ETF level.
Panel A of Table 1 shows the summary statistics of ETF characteristics. Since we are
interested in the short selling activities on ETFs, we further sort ETFs into quintile groups
based on ETF short ratio and summarize the average characteristics for each group. The
results are shown in Panel B of Table 1. One thing to note is that ETFs with the highest
short ratio are significantly larger than ETFs with lowest short ratio. This in part explains
why the value-weighted short ratio of ETFs (about 15%) is much larger than the simple
average ETF short ratio (about 4%).
2.3 ETF-Based Short Ratio for Stocks
The key innovation of our paper is to aggregate the information content in ETF short selling
activities to the stock-level and construct a variable that we call the “ETF-based short ratio”
(or ETF-based SR). Intuitively, if a stock is overvalued but also difficult to short sell directly,
traders can form “synthetic” short portfolios by combining short positions in ETFs and long
positions in other ETF constituent stocks. However, since such a synthetic portfolio can be
constructed in multiple ways if many ETFs contain the target stock, the negative information
content is gleaned most efficiently by examining stocks that lie in the intersection of several
heavily shorted ETFs.
To this end, we first calculate the total value of short interest for each ETF-month, and
we attribute short interest to its constituent stocks proportional to the value of stocks held
by the ETF. For Stock i during month t, the dollar value of short selling via ETF e equals
short valuei,e,t = short intereste,t ∗ Pe,t ∗ shares heldi,e,t ∗ Pi,t∑
j∈Je shares heldj,e,t ∗ Pj,t
(1)
20Petajisto (2017) reports that ETF premium or discount can be sizable especially for illiquid ETFs. In
our sample of US domestic equity ETFs, however, the average and median premium is close to zero basis
point.
14
where Pe,t denotes the per share price of ETF e, Pi,t denotes the per share price of Stock i,
Je denotes the set of stocks held by ETF e, and shares heldi,e,t denotes the number of Stock
i’s shares held by ETF e at last quater end t.
Then, for Stock i, we aggregate the dollar value of short selling across all ETFs that hold
Stock i during month t, and scale it by the total dollar value of Stock i held by ETFs:
ETF-based SR =
∑
e∈Ei short valuei,e,t∑
e∈Ei shares heldi,e,t ∗ Pi,t
(2)
where Ei is the set of ETFs that hold Stock i.
Figure 2 shows the time-series of the ETF-based short ratio for an average stock and
compares it to the ratio for direct short selling. The figure shows two important consid-
erations: First, the ETF-based short ratio is highly correlated with the stock short ratio;
there is a significant spike during the recent financial crisis. Second, the ETF-based short
ratio is considerably higher than the direct short ratio. For the majority of our sample,
the ETF-based short ratio is above 10% while the direct short ratio is between 4–5%. This
reflects the fact that a share of the same stock is more intensively shorted when it is held
via an ETF than when it is directly held.
2.4 Stock Characteristics
Table 2 presents the summary statistics of the stock characteristics. Panel A reports the
time-series average of the cross-sectional means and standard deviations of the variables
for the full sample. The average short interest ratio (SR) in our sample period is 4.16%.
The median SR is around 2.76%. This means that while most stocks have low shorting
activity, a small fraction of stocks are heavily shorted. Our key variable of interest, the
ETF-based short ratio (ETF sr), has a mean of 15.97% and large cross-sectional variation,
with a standard deviation of 15.8%. The median annualized lending fee SAF is small: only
28 bp. However, the distribution of the lending fee is highly skewed to the right, with the
75 percentile less than the mean level. This is consistent with the literature that although
most stocks are easy to borrow, a small fraction of stocks with low lending supply have high
shorting costs (D’avolio (2002)). And these stocks are the most prone to overpricing induced
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by short-selling constraints. The average lendable supply is 13.80% of shares outstanding,
with a standard deviation of 8.29%. The remaining summary statistics are well known and
do not require additional discussion.
Panel B reports the pairwise rank correlation among our variables where they overlap.
As we can see, the rank correlation between the stock level short ratio and the short ratio
backed out from ETF holdings is moderate: only around 0.37.21 This suggests that the
ETF-based short ratio contains incremental information in addition to the stock’s own short
interest. In our later empirical analysis, we show that the ETF-based SR predicts returns
even after controlling for existing shorting demand or supply measures at the stock level. The
correlation between the ETF-based SR and the lending fee SAF is 0.12, which is consistent
with our hypothesis that arbitrageurs use ETFs to target hard-to-borrow stocks.
As there might be nonlinear relationship between the ETF-based SR and other stock
characteristics, we further look at average stock characteristics across quintile portfolios
sorted on their ETF-based SR. As we can see from Panel C of Table 2, stocks with the
lowest and highest ETF-based SR are, on average, much smaller, less liquid, and more
volatile. More importantly, we find that these stocks are also more costly to short sell.
They have higher lending fees and utilization ratios, as well as lower institutional ownership
and lendable supply. Note that the U-shaped pattern between the ETF-based SR and the
tightness of the lending market conditions is consistent with our argument, as ETFs may
be unable to alleviate shorting constraints for stocks with an extremely low lending supply.
The fact that stocks that are highly shorted via ETFs have higher-than-average short-selling
costs is sufficient to show the existence of our proposed mechanism of arbitrage via ETF.
3 Determinants of ETF Short Interest
In this section, we examine the determinants of ETF short interest. To this end, we use
both Fama-MacBeth cross-section regressions and a quasi-natural experiment of regulation
SHO. If, as we hypothesize, ETF short selling provides an alternative mechanism for market
participants to gain negative exposure to underlying stocks, we should expect ETF short
21The pearson correlation between stocks’ SR and ETF-based SR is even lower at around 0.17.
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interest to be affected by the tightness of the short-selling activities of the underlying stocks.
3.1 Fama–MacBeth Regressions
To understand what determines the level of short interest for ETFs, we run monthly Fama
and MacBeth (1973) regressions of ETF short ratios on ETF characteristics and the charac-
teristics of ETFs’ underlying stocks. The dependent variable, ETF short ratio, is defined as
the monthly short interest scaled by ETF shares outstanding. ETF characteristics include
ETF turnover, the logarithm of ETF market capitalization (ME), the ETF annual expense
ratio, the ETF’s past 12-month return, the ETF’s monthly return volatility, and the annual
expense ratio of the ETF. To account for the opportunities of instantaneous arbitrage be-
tween ETFs and their underlying stock baskets, we include the deviation between an ETF’s
price and the ETF’s net asset value (NAV). The characteristics of underlying stocks include
the logarithm of stock market capitalization (ME), the book-to-market ratio (BM), idiosyn-
cratic volatility, and the Amihud stock illiquidity measure22. The final set of independent
variables pertain to the short-selling activities of underlying stocks: stock short ratio, stock
institutional ownership, stock lendable supply (scaled by shares outstanding), stock utiliza-
tion ratio, and stock lending fee (i.e., the DCBS score between 1 and 10). All stock-related
variables are value-weighted and aggregated to the ETF-month level. The standard errors
are adjusted for serial correlated using Newey-West method.
Column (1) of Table 3 reports the effects of ETF and stock characteristics on the ETF
short ratio. The turnover ratio of an ETF is a deciding factor of its short selling activity.
To the extent that turnover ratio represents the trading liquidity of the ETF, this result is
consistent with the intuition that high liquidity of ETFs attracts short sellers who are wary
of short selling risks. Although the size of ETFs (ETF Ln(ME)) does not have a statistically
significant coefficient, it is highly correlated with the turnover ratio. In unreported tests, the
size of ETFs is an important factor if we remove ETF turnover ratios from the regressions.
The price premium of ETFs relative to the NAV is another determinant of ETF short selling
activities. When an ETF is traded above the price of its underlying assets, arbitrageurs
22We do not include stock past returns, since it is highly correlated with ETF past returns (corr > .95).
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short sell the ETF and push the ETF price back to its NAV. This practice, together with
Authorized Participants (APs)’s creation of new ETF units, keeps ETF price close to its
“fair value”.
In terms of the characteristics of underlying stocks, ETFs with smaller, more illiquid,
and high-volatility (idiosyncratic) underlying stocks tend to have higher short ratios. It is
worth noting that an ETF can heavily invest in small-cap stocks (low StockLn(ME)) while
at the same time have a large market capitalization (high ETFLn(ME)).23 This baseline
result suggests that the ETF short ratio is high when the ETF itself is large and highly
liquid and/or when the underlying stocks are difficult to short. This initial evidence hints
that an ETF is an alternative channel for traders to short underlying stocks.
We then directly investigate how the short-selling activities of underlying stocks affect the
short ratio of the corresponding ETFs. In Column (2) of Table 3, we include the weighted-
average short ratio of underlying stocks as a regressor. There is a slightly positive, yet
insignificant (t = 0.27), association between the average stock short ratio and the ETF
short ratio. This is not surprising: The stock-level short ratio is an interaction result of
stock shorting demand and stock lending supply. While stronger stock shorting demand
should increase the shorting demand of its holding ETFs, an ample lending supply would
reduce the attractiveness of indirectly shorting via ETF. To better understand the underlying
mechanism that drives the ETF short ratio, one would have to disentangle the supply force
of stock short selling from the demand force. This is exactly what we do in Columns (3) to
(7).
In Columns (3) and (4), we respectively proxy for stock lending supply using 13F insti-
tutional ownership of underlying stocks and Markit lendable shares, both scaled by stock
shares outstanding. We find that both proxies for stock supply have a negative effect on the
ETF-level short ratio. A one percentage point decrease in stock institutional ownership is
associated with 6.9 bp increase in ETF short ratio (t = 3.28), and a one percentage point
decrease in stock lending supply is associated with a 12.7 bp increase (t = 1.78). In Column
23For example, a small-cap ETF, Vanguard Small-Cap ETF(ticker: VB), is based on small-capitalization
stocks, for which the underlying stocks are less liquid. However, VB holds close to $50 billion in fund net
assets and trades at very low costs.
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(5), we isolate the strength of shorting demand by using the stock lending utilization ratio
(Markit reported lent shares divided by lendable shares). Our results suggest that demand
for shorting underlying stocks have a significantly positive effect on the ETF short ratio. A
one percentage point increase in the utilization ratio is associated with a 8.1 bp increase in
the ETF short ratio (t = 5.70).
Finally, in Columns (6) and (7), we examine the lending fee of the ETF and of the
underlying stocks on ETF short ratios. The lending fee for both ETFs and underlying stocks
are proxied by the DCBS scores provided by Markit, ranging from 1 to 10. In Column (6), a
one-point increase in ETF DCBS score is associated with a significant decrease of ETF short
ratio and a one-point increase in the DCBS lending score of underlying stocks is associated
with an increase of 1.24 percentage points (t = 3.77). In Column (7), we calculate the average
lending fee for the most expensive-to-borrow stocks within an ETF’s constituents and find
that their average lending fee is driving the short ratio of holding ETFs (t = 7.86) and
render the average lending fee of all consituent stocks insignificant. This is consistent with
our hypothesis that ETFs short selling is particularly attractive for synthetically shorting
their difficult-to-short constituents. High lending fees to access some of the underlying stocks
contained in the ETF seem to be an important driver for ETF short-selling acitivites.
To gain a better understanding of the short-substitute mechanism at work between ETFs
and their underlying stocks, we conduct another set of tests that interact the ETF turnover
ratio with measures of how difficult a stock is to borrow. The intuition behind these tests is
that investors are more likely to substitute stock-level shorting with ETF-level shorting when
stocks are difficult to short and the holding ETFs are more liquid. Table A1 reports the
interaction results. Consistent with our hypothesis, in shorting difficult-to-short underlying
stocks, investors are more likely to utilize ETFs that have better liquidity (proxied by higher
turnover ratios). In other words, the substitution effect between stock short selling and
ETF short selling is more intensive when the ETF in question is not subject to short-selling
constraints.
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3.2 Evidence from a Randomized Experiment: Regulation SHO
One advantage of synthetic shorting via ETFs is that ETFs are not subject to the “uptick”
rule. The uptick rule has been installed since 1938, and it requires (to state it simply) that
a short sale order is placed above the last traded price, or “uptick”. Previous research has
shown that the uptick rule significantly impedes the abilities of traders when executing short
sales (Alexander and Peterson (2008)). Our study uses a policy change that suspended the
uptick rule for a random sample of stocks to examine the causal impact of removing the
uptick rule on the short-selling activities of ETFs that hold such stocks.
On July 28, 2004, the SEC announced the Regulation SHO program. It selected a pilot
group that included 986 firms to test the impact of short-selling restrictions on the market
and to facilitate related research.24 These firms were selected from the Russell 3000 index.
According to the SEC, firms were separated into three groups based on their respective
stock exchanges (NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ). Within each group, firms were ranked
from highest to lowest according to their average daily dollar trading volume over the past
year. The SEC then selected every third stock from each of the three groups for the pilot
program.
The pilot program went into effect on May 2005. Our difference-in-differences empirical
design examines the ETF-based short ratio of pilot stocks and the rest of the Russell 3000
stocks before and after the enactment of the Pilot Program. Because pilot stocks became
easier to short directly after the Pilot Program25, we hypothesize that the demand for shorting
these stocks via ETFs would lessen. Hence, the weighted-average short ratio of the pilot
stocks’ holding ETFs would decrease following the program commencement.
Our estimation window included the 12 months before the inception of the Pilot Program
(May 2005) and the 12 months after. Only Russell 3000 stocks are included in the regression
sample. The dependent variable is the ETF-based short ratio for the stock. The treatment
dummy is assigned for the 986 stocks that were included in the Pilot Program. The difference-
24For more complete background information regarding Regulation SHO Pilot Program and its effects, see
Diether, Lee, and Werner (2009a), Grullon, Michenaud, and Weston (2015), among others.
25Diether, Lee, and Werner (2009a) find that the short interest of the pilot stocks increased after the Pilot
Program was enacted.
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in-differences specification is defined as:
ETF sri,t = β0+β1Postt>=May2005∗Treatmenti+β2Treatmenti+β3Postt>=May2005+i,t (3)
Our hypothesis indicates that β1 < 0.
Table 4 shows the regression results. In the baseline specification of Column (1), we
find that the ETF-based short ratios decrease by 0.88 percentage points (t = 2.72) after
May 2005 for stocks that were selected into the Reg SHO Pilot Program relative to control
stocks. This difference in difference results cannot be attributed to heterogeneity in stocks
both because the treatment status is randomly assigned to stocks, and indeed the coefficient
on the Pilot Stocks in indistinguishable from zero. In Columns (2) and (3), we further control
for stock characteristics (including the direct stock-level short ratio), stock fixed-effects, and
time fixed-effects. The decrease in Pilot Stocks’ ETF-based short ratio is barely changed.
This is strong evidence that the relaxation of stock-level short-sale constraints causes the
decrease of indirect short selling via the holding ETFs.
In the Appendix, we examine the causal impact of Regulation SHO at the ETF-level.
We rank ETFs by the proportion of constituents that are included in the Pilot Program.
“Treatment” ETFs are the top 10 ETFs with the highest pilot stock proportion, while
the “control” ETFs are the bottom 10 ETFs. The dependent variable in the diff-in-diff
specification is the ETF short ratio. We find that, compared to control ETFs, treatment
ETFs have a significantly lower short ratio after the inception of the Pilot Program. The
economic magnitude of the drop in short ratio for treatment ETFs is around 2 percentage
points and are highly significant statistically. These results are be found in Table A2.
3.3 Evidence for the “Create-to-Lend” Mechanism
There are several advantages of using ETFs to create a synthetic short position for a subset
of its underlying stocks relative to direct short selling, as we have discussed in Section 1.
One such advantage is that arbitrageurs can enter short positions via the “create-to-lend”
mechanism. The prime brokers usually borrow all underlying securities of the ETF, create
a new unit of the ETF, and lend it to short sellers for a fee. If the said mechanism is cost
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effective for short sellers, one should expect the growth of ETF shares to covary with the
short-selling activities of the ETF and its underlying components. To empirically test this
hypothesis, we run panel regressions with ETF fixed-effects to examine the within-fund,
time-series variation in the rate of share creation for ETFs.
The dependent variable of interest is the rate of ETF shares growth, ∆Sharest/Sharest−1.
A higher growth rate means more ETF shares are created as a fraction of existing shares.
One can understand the variable as the “flow” measure in the mutual fund literature. The
ETF shares growth is then regressed on the ETF short ratio, the shorting demand and supply
of the underlying stocks, and a whole host of control variables. Since there is a wide variation
in terms of ETF market presence (think of a Blackrock ETF versus an obscure ETF), all
regressions include ETF fixed-effects. Hence we are isolating the within-ETF variation in
time-series.
In Column (1) of Table 5, ETF shares growth is regressed on the short ratio of the ETF
at month t, and the regression coefficient is positive and highly significant (t = 2.40). This
is consistent with the hypothesis that the shorting activities of an ETF is one main driver
for the creation of the ETF shares because of the “create-to-lend” mechanism. As more
and more arbitrageurs demand short positions in the ETF, their brokers create instead of
borrowing ETF units and lend them to the traders.
In Columns (2), (3), and (4) of Table 5, the ETF shares growth rate is regressed on
the short-selling demand and supply of the ETF’s underlying stocks. When the demand of
shorting underlying stocks is high or the supply of lendable shares is low, one should expect
arbitrageurs to take advantage of the “create-to-lend” mechanism to short sell the ETF and,
in the meantime, increase the number of shares of the ETF. This intuition is confirmed by
the panel regression results: In Column (2), stock lending utilization, a proxy for shorting
demand of underlying stocks, is positively correlated with ETF shares growth (t = 4.54). In
Column (3), a higher underlying stock lending fee is associated with more rapid ETF shares
growth (t = 1.51). In Column (4), the lending supply of underlying stocks is negatively
related to ETF shares growth t = −6.82).
Also worth noting is the fact that ETF lending fee score is significantly positively asso-
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ciated with ETF shares growth. To the extent that ETF lending cost is a direct measure
of demand for shorting the ETF, the positive relation between ETF lending cost and shares
growth is consistent with our hypothesis that short selling demand in part drives the creation
of new ETF units. Put together, the evidence sheds light on the channels short sellers use to
take short positions on ETFs and to ultimately gain short-side exposure to underlying secu-
rities. The “create-to-lend” mechanism appears to be an important advantage for synthetic
short selling using ETFs.
3.4 Does ETF Short-Selling Predict ETF Returns?
The literature on stock short selling has shown that stock-level short ratios have predictive
power over stock future returns (e.g., Figlewski (1981); Dechow, Hutton, Meulbroek, and
Sloan (2001); Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter (2005)). A natural question to ask is whether
ETF short selling has similar predictive power. The answer to this question could help us
better understand the motivation for traders to short sell ETFs. On the one hand, if most
of the traders who short sell ETFs take short positions to hedge their other trades, highly
shorted ETFs would not necessarily underperform lightly shorted ETFs. On the other hand,
if ETF short sellers are betting against the whole market or sector, or if they use synthetic
shorting strategy to gain exposure to a subset of ETFs’ underlying constituent stocks, we
would expect highly shorted ETFs to perform poorly compared to lightly shorted ETFs.
To empirically investigate this question, we sort ETFs into quintile portfolios each month
based on their short ratio and hold them over the next month. The portfolio return is
weighted either equally or by the market cap of the ETFs. A long-short portfolio is formed
by taking a long position in the most lightly shorted ETF portfolio (Quintile 1) and a short
position in the most heavily shorted ETF portfolio (Quintile 5). The return series runs from
January 2002 to December 2013.
Table 6 reports the returns of five ETF portfolios as well as the return for the long-
short portfolio. In Panel A, returns are equal-weighted. The monthly return spread for the
long-short portfolio that buys ETFs that are lightly shorted and sells ETFs that are heavily
shorted is 11 basis points with a t-stat of 1.08. After adjusting for the Fama and French
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(1993) three factors and the Carhart (1997) four factors, the long-short abnormal return
is about 24 bp per month with a t-stat exceeding 3. The profitability of the long-short
strategy indicates that heavily-shorted ETFs indeed underperform lightly-shorted one in the
following month.
In Panel B, returns are value-weighted, and the return predictability of ETF short ratio
is similar to the equal-weighted strategy. The profitability of the long-short strategy is about
16 to 20 basis points per month, depending on the risk-adjustment. The t-statistics range
from 2.16 to 2.95.
Taken together, our empirical results echo the findings of predicative power on equity
short ratio literature (e.g. Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter (2005)): ETF short sellers seem to
have superior information about future returns of the ETFs, or at least some of their con-
stituent stocks; and they are able to create abnormal returns by short selling. However, one
can do better in utilizing the information content in ETF short ratios: if short sellers want to
create synthetic short positions for a subset of stocks using ETFs, there are multiple ways of
doing it. On average, a stock in our sample is held by more than 20 ETFs. Therefore, stocks
that are held by multiple heavily-shorted ETFs are more likely to be the true targets of short
sellers and have negative future returns. In the next section, we aggregate the information
content in ETF short selling to the stock level and examine the return predictability of ETF
shorting for individual stocks. We show that we are able to construct trading strategies that
generate much larger abnormal returns.
4 ETF Short Selling and the Cross-Section of Stock
Returns
To the extent that arbitrageurs use ETFs to express their bearish opinions on individual
stocks, stocks that are heavily shorted via their ETF holdings should expect to earn negative
returns in the future. Moreover, if arbitrageurs are more likely to switch to ETFs when their
target stocks are difficult to borrow, then the return predictability of the ETF-based short
ratio should be concentrated among stocks that have severe impediments to shorting. In this
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section, we test the return predictability of the ETF-based short ratio using both portfolio
sorts and Fama-MacBeth regressions.
4.1 Portfolio Sorts
In this section, we show that stocks sorted on their ETF-based short ratio generate significant
return spreads. We conduct the decile portfolio sorts as follows. At the end of each month, we
sort stocks into deciles by their ETF-based short ratios. We then compute the average return
of each decile portfolio over the next month, both equal-weighted and value-weighted. This
gives us a time series of monthly returns for each decile. We use these time series to compute
the average return of each decile over the entire sample. As we are most interested in the
return spread between the two extreme portfolios, we also report the return to a long–short
portfolio (i.e., a zero-investment portfolio that goes long the stocks in the lowest ETF-based
short ratio decile and shorts the stocks in the highest decile). We report the average return
(and associated t-statistics) of this long–short portfolio in the leftmost columns, with the
Fama and French (1993) 3-factor adjusted alphas in the middle and the Carhart (1997) 4-
factor alphas in the rightmost column. Our sample is from January 2002 to December 2013.
Table 7 reports the result.
In Panel A of Table 7, the equal-weighted return decreases from 1.58% to 0.83% from
the lowest decile to highest decile of ETF-based short ratio. The return spread for the long-
short portfolio sorted on ETF-based short ratio is 0.76% per month, with a t-stat of 2.55.
Adjusting for risk exposure to the Fama and French (1993) three-factors increases the long-
short return spread to 0.90% (t=3.05). For four-factor adjusted alphas, the return spread is
0.94% per month, with a t-stat of 3.21. In Panel B, we see that the value-weighted results are
weaker but are nonetheless statistically and economically significant across the board. For
excess returns, the result is 0.42% with a t-statistic of 1.14. The figure increases to around
0.78% for the three- and four-factor alphas and both figures are now statistically significant.
So, regardless of the metric, stocks that are heavily shorted via ETFs underperform those
lightly shorted. The economic magnitude is quite impressive given the fact that many
other well-documented anomalies are no longer profitable in our sample period (Chordia,
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Subrahmanyam, and Tong (2014)).
Table A4 reports the portfolio returns based on quintile sorts of ETF-based short ratio.
The equally-weighted long-short strategy generates 0.65% (t-stat=2.64) four-factor alpha
and for value-weighted alpha, it is 0.37% (t-stat=1.84). A remark on the lending costs
of this strategy: since the actual lending cost SAF is available only for the latter half of
our sample, we are unable to calculate the after-fee profitability of our long-short strategy.
However, note that the average lending fee for the high ETF sr quintile of stocks is about
1.18 percentage point per annum. In contrast, the annualized abnormal return for the long-
short strategy is more than 7.8 percentage points (0.65*12). Hence, it is not likely that the
strategy abnormal return would be subsumed by the lending costs.
In Table A5, we look at the factor loadings of the long-short portfolio on the Carhart
(1997) four factors. For equal-weighted portfolios, it loads negatively on the market and
momentum factor, but does not load significantly on the size or value factor. For value-
weighted portfolios, it loads negatively on the market and size factors, but positively on
value factor. The large negatively loading on the market factor may explain why factor-
adjusted alphas are even larger than the raw return spread.
In Table A6, we examine the robustness of our portfolio sorts. The first row shows
the return spread when returns are weighted by past month gross return, as suggested
by Asparouhova, Bessembinder, and Kalcheva (2013). The gross-return-weighted return
spread is 0.8% (t=2.76). Next we show our results barely change when we substract the
industry-level return from stock return. This suggests the nature of information contained
in ETF short interests is related to firm-specific information. In the third column, we
augment the Carhart (1997) four-factors with the Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity
factor, since stocks in the extreme deciles are less liquid as shown in the summary statistics
tables. The Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2003) five-factor adjusted alpha is 0.88% (t=3.01) for
the equal-weighted portfolio and 0.80% (t=2.52) for the value-weighted portfolio. The third
row shows that our results hold when we use the Fama and French (2016) five factors to
calculate alphas. Our results actually become stronger, with a monthly return spread of
1.14% (t=3.82) for the equal-weighted portfolio and 0.85% (t=2.56) for the value-weighted
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portfolio. This suggests our long-short portfolio is not merely loading on the profitability
and investment factor as proposed by Fama and French (2016). The fourth row shows that
our results still hold when we use the Stambaugh and Yuan (2015) mispricing factor model
to compute alpha. The portfolio generates equal-weighted alpha of 1.20%(t=4.13) and value-
weighted alpha of 0.74%(t=2.26). Using Hou, Xue and Zhang (2015) Q-factor model also do
not change our results, as shown in the fifth row. The sixth row of Table A6 shows that our
results survive when we exclude stocks that have a price less than $5 at the sorting month.
Again, the strategy based on ETF-based short ratio generates a monthly excess return of
0.46% (t=2.39) and 0.48% (t=2.04) when equal-weighted or value-weighted, respectively.
The seventh and eighth rows show that our results hold for stocks listed on both NYSE-
Amex and NASDAQ stock exchanges. The ninth row shows that the long-short alphas are
still highly significant if we skip a month between when we sort stocks and when we measure
strategy returns. The last row reports the long-short alpha when we form decile portfolios
based on the residual ETF-based short ratio, where the residual is obtained after purging
out the effect of stock’s own short ratio26. The equal-weighted long-short alpha is still 0.75%
and highly significant, although the value-weighted alpha is marginally insignificant. Across
almost all the specifications in Table A6, stocks heavily shorted via ETFs underperform
lightly shorted stocks.
4.2 Two-Way Sorts on ETF-Based Short Ratio and Limits to Ar-
bitrage
Having established the return predictability of the ETF-based short ratio through univariate
portfolio sorts, we next examine whether the return predictability varies across stocks with
different level of direct stock short ratio and with different degree of limits to arbitrage. Our
hypothesis is that some arbitrageurs short ETFs to circumvent short-selling constraints at
the stock level, hence the return predictability of ETF-based short ratio should be stronger
among such difficult-to-short stocks.
As a first pass, we conduct sequential doubt sorts first on stock-level short ratio and
26Specifically, each month we run a cross-sectional regression of the ETF-based short ratio on stocks’ own
short ratio and take the regression residual as our sorting variable.
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then on ETF-based short ratio. As will be discussed in later subsection within the context
of Fama-MacBeth regressions, stock-level short ratio has been shown to negatively predict
future stock returns. The double sorting tells us whether our ETF-based short ratio has
information contents about future stock returns on top of stock-level short selling activities.
To implement the sorting, at the end of each month, all stocks are sorted into terciles based on
their stock-level short ratio, and within each tercile, we further sort the stocks into quintiles
based on their ETF-based short ratio (ETF sr).
The equal-weighted and value-weighted portfolio returns are reported in Table 8. In both
equal-weighting and value-weighting results, the additional predicative power of ETF-based
short ratio is significant within stocks that have the lowest stock-level short ratios. The
monthly four-factor abnormal returns for the low-stock SR tercile is 0.77% (t = 2.60) for
equal-weighted portfolio and 0.83% (t = 2.32) for value weighted portfolio, similar to results
from unconditional sorts. For stocks in top two stock short ratio terciles, however, ETF-
based short ratio generates portfolio spreads indistinguishable from zero. The difference
of abnormal return based on ETF-based SR in low stock-SR and high stock-SR portfolio is
about 0.60% and significant. The interpretation of the results from first two-way sorts is that
ETF-based short ratio is particularly informative of future stock returns when stock-level
short ratios are suppressed, potentially due to stock-level short sale constraints.
To further explore the relation between informativeness of ETF-based short ratio and
stock-level arbitrage frictions, we conduct a second group of sequential double sorts. At the
end of each month, all stocks are sorted into terciles based on a specific proxy for limits to
arbitrage, and within each tercile, we further sort the stocks into quintiles based on their
ETF-based short ratio (ETF sr). Returns are equally weighted within each portfolio. We use
multiple measures of arbitrage frictions, including lendable supply, institutional ownership,
lending fee, idiosyncratic volatility, turnover, and Amihud (2002) illiquidity. The first three
measures are more closely related to the constraints in the equity lending market, while the
latter three measures belong to more general arbitrage frictions.
Table 9 report the monthly Carhart (1997) four-factor alphas for each portfolio. In Panel
A, we use the lendable share supply as a proxy for limits to arbitrage, which directly mea-
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sures the tightness of the equity lending market. Consistent with our hypothesis, the return
spread on the ETF-based short ratio is much higher among stocks with low lending supply.
Specifically, the four-factor alpha is 0.73% (t=1.98) in the lowest lendable supply tercile.
The figure is only 0.27% and 0.22% for the other two terciles, and is no longer significant.
The difference of alpha between stocks with low and high lendable supply is 0.52%(t=1.77).
In Panel B, we show that the same pattern is observed when we use institutional owner-
ship as a proxy for short-sale constraints (Nagel (2005)). Because institutional investors
actively participate in stock lending programs, the fraction of shares owned by institutional
investors is highly correlated with actual lending supply.27 Consistent with our hypothesis,
the four-factor alpha based on ETF sr is 1.20% (t=3.59) in the tercile with lowest institu-
tional ownership, while it decreases to 0.25% for stocks with high institutional ownership.
The difference of alpha between stocks with low and high institutional ownership is 0.95%
and highly significant.
In panel C, we use the stock lending fee as a more direct proxy for short-sale constraints
(Jones and Lamont (2002); Drechsler and Drechsler (2014)). Following the literature, we
sort stocks into two groups based on whether a stock’s DCBS score is above 2. As we can
see, the return predictability of ETF-based short ratio is significantly amplified among stocks
with elevated borrowing cost. The monthly four-factor alpha is 1.76% (t-stat=3.94) among
stocks with DCBS scores above 2, and only 0.40% among stocks with DCBS scores below 2.
Pontiff (2006) argues that stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility are more costly to
arbitrage. Duan, Hu, and McLean (2010) and Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2015) provide
empirical evidence supporting this argument. Panel D of Table 9 reports the double sorting
results when we use idiosyncratic volatility as a proxy for limits to arbitrage. The monthly
return spread is 0.99% (t=2.75) for stocks in the highest tercile of idiosyncratic volatility, and
is much smaller in magnitude and less significant for stocks with low idiosyncratic volatility.
Hong, Li, Ni, Scheinkman, and Yan (2015) argues that short selling is highly sensitive to
stock liquidity, as arbitrageurs worry about crowded trades in illiquid securities. Panel E
presents the results when we use monthly turnover as a proxy for limits to arbitrage. The
monthly alpha is 0.98% (t=2.51) for stocks in the lowest turnover tercile, and close to 0%
27Cross-sectional correlation between institutional ownership and lendable supply is 0.79 in our sample.
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when stocks have high turnover. In Panel F, we use Amihud (2002) illiquidity as proxy for
stock liquidity level and find similar results.
In summary, the stronger return predictability of ETF-based short ratio among stocks
with low lendable supply, high lending fee, high idiosyncratic volatility, and low liquidity
is consistent with our hypothesis that arbitrageurs effectively use ETFs to create synthetic
short positions on stocks that are costly to short.
4.3 Fama-MacBeth Regressions
We now test our main hypothesis using the Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression method-
ology. One advantage of this methodology is that it allows us to examine the predictive
power of ETF-based short ratio while controlling for known predictors of cross-sectional
stock returns. This is important because, as shown in Table 2, ETF-based short ratio is
correlated with some of these predictors. We conduct the Fama-MacBeth regressions in the
usual way. Each month, starting in February 2002 and ending in December 2013, we run
a cross-sectional regression of stock returns on ETF sr and a set of control variables known
to predict returns, including the natural logarithm of the book-to-market ratio (LnBM), the
natural logarithm of the market value of equity (LnME), returns from the prior month (Rev),
returns from the prior 12-month period excluding month t-1 (Mom), institutional ownership
(IO), and idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL).
Table 10 reports the time-series averages of the coefficients on the independent variables,
and the t-statistics are Newey-West adjusted with twelve lags to control for heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation. We only include ETF-based short ratio (ETF sr) in Column (1) as a
baseline and it has a negative coefficient of -0.022 (t=2.52). This is consistent with our
portfolio sorting results in which stocks that are heavily shorted via ETFs have lower future
returns. In Column (2), we add the usual controls including size, book-to-market ratio, past
1-month returns, and past 12-month returns. The coefficient on ETF sr decreases to -0.013
with a t-stat of 2.50. In Column (3), we further add institutional ownership and idiosyncratic
volatility in the regression, and ETF sr still negatively predicts future returns. The economic
magnitude is also quite large. The difference of ETF-based short ratio between the lowest
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decile portfolio and highest decile portfolio is 0.48, which implies a monthly return spread
of 60 bp between these two extreme deciles. The magnitude estimated from Fama-MacBeth
regression is in line with our portfolio sorting results. For the control variables, the sign
of coefficients is consistent with previous literature, except for momentum, which attracts
a negative coefficient.28 Due to the short sample period, however, the coefficients on most
control variables are not significantly different from zero.
Our ETF-based short ratio is constructed as the dollar value of short interests via ETFs
over the dollar value held by all ETFs for a stock. One might be concerned that the return
predictability we document so far is driven by the denominator rather than the numerator in
Equation (2). This could arise if ETF ownership is informative about future stock returns.
To address this concern, we construct an alternative version of ETF-based SR (ETF sr2) by
replacing the demoninator in Equation (2) with the stock’s market capitalization. Column
(4) of Table 10 shows that this alternative ETF-based SR attracts a negative coefficient of
-0.68 (t-stat=-2.57). Thus the return predictability of ETF-based SR is mainly driven by the
shorting demand on individual stocks through ETFs, rather than the information content of
ETF ownership.
ETFs play an increasingly important role in financial market during more recent period.
We thus expect the synthetic shorting with ETFs channel will be more effective in the second
half of our sample. To empirically test this hypothesis, We run Fama-MacBeth regression of
stock return on ETF-based SR for two subperiods: one from 2002 to 2007 and another from
2008 to 2013. The result is reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table A7. Consistent with
our conjecture, the coefficient on ETF-based SR is three times larger in the second half of
sample period compared to the first half of sample period.
Our paper argues that ETF short interests provide incremental information about stock-
level expected return beyond what contained in stock’s own short ratio and hence the ob-
served return predictability. A plausible alternative is that the return predictability of ETF-
based SR is due to short sellers use ETFs to bet on sector-level mispricing. To distinguish
between the two explanations, we run Fama-MacBeth regression of stocks’ excess return on
28This is due to the 2009 momentum crash, see Daniel and Moskowitz (2014). The coefficient on Momen-
tum becomes positive once we exclude 2009 from our sample.
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ETF-based SR, where excess return is computed after substracting industry-level return.
We use Fama-French 48 industry as the industry classification. As we can see in Column (3)
of Table A7, the coefficient on ETF sr is still significantly negative, with a coefficient similar
to our baseline result. The result provides further support to our hypothesis that at least
some investors short ETFs to take a negative bet on individual stocks instead of the whole
sector.
In Table A8, we examine the persistence of the return predictability of ETF-based short
ratio. The dependent variables from Columns (1) to (12) correspond to monthly stock
returns from 1 month to 12 month ahead. The predictive power of ETF sr slowly decays
from -0.012 to -0.002, but is still significant for forecasting returns up to seven months in
the future. The strong persistence of the predictability of ETF-based short ratio support
our hypothesis that arbitrageurs target difficult-to-short stocks via shorting ETFs, and the
overpricing associated with these stocks are only slowly corrected over time.
4.4 Controlling for Stock-Level Short-Selling Measures
A large literature on short selling documents that stock-level short interest is a negative
predictor of future returns. Several recent papers find that in addition to shorting demand,
lending supply and borrowing costs also negatively predict stock returns.29 To test whether
our ETF-based short ratio contains incremental predictive power, we control for various
measures of stock-level shorting measures in Fama-MacBeth regressions. The result is re-
ported in Table 11. In Column (1), we add the stock’s own short interest ratio (SR) in
the regression. Consistent with prior literature, SR is a strong negative predictor of future
returns, with a coefficient of -0.04 and t-stat of 4.55. The coefficient on ETF-based short
ratio (ETF sr), however, survives with a coefficient of -0.01 (t=2.03), which suggests that
information extracted from ETFs’ short interest is not fully absorbed by the stock’s own
short ratio. The economic effect of ETF-based short ratio on return is comparable to that of
the stocks’ short ratio. A one standard deviation shock to ETF-based short ratio translate
into 15 bp of expected return, while the figure is 20 bp for stock short ratio. In Column (2),
29See for example, Drechsler and Drechsler (2014) and Beneish, Lee, and Nichols (2015), among others.
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we add the stocks’ lending fee measure (DCBS) in the Fama-MacBeth regression. Consistent
with Drechsler and Drechsler (2014), the lending fee negatively and strongly predicts future
returns with a t-stat of 5.62. More importantly, however, the coefficient on our ETF sr is
-0.011 and still significant at 1% level.
In Columns (3) and (4), we control for the stocks’ utilization ratios and SIO, respectively.
Utilization is the ratio of shares borrowed to shares made available by Markit lenders. SIO
is the short interest ratio scaled by institutional ownership. These two variables measure the
tightness of the securities lending market by taking the intersection of shorting demand and
supply. A stock that is highly shorted despite its low supply of lendable shares means the
stock is more likely facing binding short-sale constraints. As we can see, the coefficients on
the utilization ratio and SIO are indeed significantly negative. However, ETF-based short
ratio continues to predict returns with t-stats of around 2.10. In Column (5), we control
for stocks’ lendable supply and the return predictability of the ETF-based short ratio still
holds. In the last Column, we show the return predictability of ETF-based SR still holds
when we control for both the stock’s own SR and lending fee.
4.5 ETF Short Selling and Short-Sale Constraints
In this section, we test our second prediction that ETF-bases short ratio has more pronounced
return predictability among difficult-to-short stocks. We do so by running Fama-MacBeth
regressions of returns on ETF-based short ratio (ETF sr) and its interaction with variables
indicating binding short-sale constraints. The results are reported in Table 12.
In Column (1), we create a dummy variable LowIO, which is equal to one when the stock
is in the bottom quintile of institutional ownership ratio in the cross-section. Our controls
always include stock-level SR, so any return predictability associated with a stock’s own SR
will be absorbed. Our variable of interest is ETFsr lowIO, the interaction between ETF sr
and LowIO dummy. As we can see, the coefficient on ETFsr LowIO is -0.02 with a t-stat
of 2.67. The coefficient on ETF sr itself is negative but no longer significant, which suggests
that the negative predictability of the ETF-based short ratio is concentrated among stocks
with greater short-sale constraints. This coefficient implies that the predictive power of
33
ETF-based short ratio increases by 5 times for stocks in the bottom quintile of institutional
ownership compared to stocks outside this group. In Column (2), we interact ETF sr with
a dummy Lowsupply, which indicates whether a stock is in the bottom quintile of lendable
supply. The coefficient on this interaction term is negative with a t-stat of 1.04. In Column
(3), we use the utilization ratio to proxy for the tightness of the lending market. Highutil
is a dummy variable that equals one when the stock is in the top quintile of utilization
in the cross-section. The coefficient on the interaction between ETF sr and Highutil is
again negative and significant at the 10% level. Column (4) reports the result when we use
lending fee as proxy for shorting constraints. The variable Highfee is a dummy equal to
one when the stock is in the top quintile of lending fee distributions. The coefficient on this
interaction term is -0.018 with a t-stat of 3.26. In Column (5), our proxy for frictions in
the shorting market is stock turnover, as Hong, Li, Ni, Scheinkman, and Yan (2015) point
out that short sellers are reluctant to take large positions in low-turnover stocks. Consistent
with this intuition, ETF-based short ratio exerts stronger return predictability among stocks
with low turnover. Our last proxy for short-sale constraints is whether the stock has any
exchange-traded put option, as previous studies find that put options facilitate short sellers
to express negative views through trading on the option market (Boehme, Danielsen, and
Sorescu (2006); Danielsen and Sorescu (2001)). The variable Noput is a dummy that equals
one when the stock has no put option traded in this month. Supporting our hypothesis,
Column (6) shows that the return predictability of ETF-based short ratio is much more
pronounced for the subset of stocks without a put option.
5 ETF Ownership and Capital Market Anomalies
Our final set of tests explore the implication of ETF short selling on capital market anoma-
lies. Many papers argue that constraints in the equity lending market are the key imped-
iment to information arbitrage and that these constraints drive the persistence of several
well-documented stock return anomalies (Nagel (2005); Beneish, Lee, and Nichols (2015);
Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012); Drechsler and Drechsler (2014)). We argue that the rise of
ETFs could alleviate short-sale constraints and contribute to a more efficient stock market.
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There are two potential channels through which ETFs may lead to a more informationally
efficient stock market. The first channel is the well-documented stock lending channel, as
ETFs are among the main contributors to the short-selling market (Blocher and Whaley
(2015); Massa, Zhang, and Zhang (2015)). Because the ETF industry thrives on its low-fee
reputation, ETFs often lend out shares to short-sellers to generate additional income that
allows them to reduce fees.30 The second channel is what we propose in this paper: ETFs
allow arbitrageurs to establish synthetic short positions on stocks that are otherwise difficult
to short.
To distinguish between these two channels, we must create portfolios that have a large
spread in ETF ownership but have a similar level of stock shorting costs. To achieve this, we
conduct sequential triple sorts, first on stock lending fee, then on ETF ownership, and finally
on anomaly characteristics. For each month, we sort stocks into two groups based on their
lending score DCBS. Stocks with a DCBS score less than or equal to 2 are usually cheap
to borrow and are called “general collateral”. Stocks with DCBS larger than 2 are more
costly to short and are called “special” stocks. Within each group, we further sort stocks
into two buckets based on their ETF ownership. This essentially creates portfolios with large
differences in ETF ownership but with similar levels of lending costs.31 Within each ETF
ownership sorted bucket, we sort stocks into terciles based on anomaly characteristics, and
we calculate the bucket’s long-short anomaly return as the difference between the returns
of the extreme portfolios. We consider a total of 10 well-studied anomalies, including book-
to-market (Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994)), accurals (Sloan (1996)), net operating
assets (Hirshleifer, Hou, Teoh, and Zhang (2004)), asset growth (Cooper, Gulen, and Schill
(2008)), capital investment (Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004)), long-run reversal (Bondt and
Thaler (1985)), composite issuance (Daniel and Titman (2006)), gross profitability (Novy-
Marx (2013)), return-on-assets (Fama and French (2006)) and price momentum (Jegadeesh
and Titman (1993)). As ETF ownership only matters when stocks are subject to short-
selling constraints in the first place, we focus on the anomaly returns for stocks with their
30The Spearman correlation between ETF ownership and lendable supply is 0.73. The Spearman correla-
tion between ETF ownership and lending fee DCBS scores is -0.32.
31As we see from Table 13, the difference in lending fees between the two ETF ownership sorted buckets
are economically small.
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DCBS scores greater than 2 in Table 13.
Panel A of Table 13 reports the monthly return spread. Across 10 anomalies, 6 have
a larger return spread in the low-ETF ownership bucket. For example, the value premium
is 1.04% (t=1.94) among low ETF-ownership stocks, and it is only 0.55% (t=1.36) among
high-ETF ownership stocks. We observe a similar pattern for accrual, net operating assets,
asset growth, investment, and long-run reversal. For composite equity issuance, the return
spread is quite similar between low- and high- ETF ownership bucket. However, for three
anomalies, we actually find a more pronounced return spread when ETF ownership is high.
Panel B reports the four-factor adjusted alphas, and the pattern is similar to the raw return
spread reported in Panel A.
On balance, the evidence presented in this section suggests that ETFs could alleviate
stock-level short selling constraints, as it allows arbitrageurs to take short positions on certain
stocks and contributes to an informationally efficient capital market.
6 Conclusion
ETFs have become an important asset class in recent years. In this paper, we provide the
first empirical evidence of the scope, the determinants and the implications of ETF short
selling on the stock market. ETFs are more liquid, and are not not subject to “uptick rule”.
In addition, new ETF shares could be created for the sole purpose of short selling. For
these reasons, short selling ETFs could be used by arbitrageurs to create synthetic short
positions on stocks that are otherwise costly to short. Consistent with this hypothesis, we
find that shorting activities on ETFs increase with the difficulty of shorting their underlying
stocks. Using Regulation SHO as a quasi-natural experiment, we confirm that a relaxation
of short-sale constraints on the underlying stocks causes a decrease in the shorting activities
of the ETFs that hold the stocks.
We then construct a stock-level short ratio based on the short interests of all ETFs
holding this stock, which reflects the collective shorting demand on this stock through short
selling ETFs. We find that this ETF-based short ratio strongly predicts future returns, even
after controlling for stock-level shorting measures. A strategy that takes a long position in
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the stocks most lightly shorted via ETFs and sells the stocks most heavily shorted generates
a Carhart (1997) four-factor alpha of 94 bp on an equal-weighted basis, or 77 bp on a
value-weighted basis. The return predictability of the ETF-based short ratio is amplified
among stocks that face the most severe shorting constraints, which supports our conjecture
that ETFs are used by arbitrageurs as an avenue to circumvent short-sale constraints for
difficult-to-short stocks.
Lastly, we explore the implication of growing ETF ownership on stock market efficiency.
Across a broad set of return anomalies, we find that anomaly returns are significantly at-
tenuated conditional on high ETF ownership. Overall, our evidence suggests that ETFs
contribute to a more informationally efficient market by allowing arbitrageurs to target
overvalued stocks that are otherwise difficult to short.
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Figure 1: ETF Total Market Capitalization and Total Short-Selling Value
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This figure shows the total market capitalization of all physically replicating domestic ETFs and the
aggregate value of their mid-month open short interests. The total market cap is measured in billions of
dollars and is shown on the left axis. The value of open short interest is measured in billions of dollars and
is shown on the right axis.
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Figure 2: ETF-based Stock Short Ratio and Direct Short Ratio
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This figure shows the average (1) ETF-based short ratio (left axis); and (2) direct short ratio of stocks
(right axis). The ETF-based short ratio is calculated as the dollar value of stock shorted via ETFs divided
by the total value of stock held by the ETFs. The direct short interest ratio is calculated as the number of
shares shorted directly divided by the total number of shares outstanding.
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Figure 3: 4-Factor Alphas of Decile Portfolios Sorted on ETF-based Short Ratio
This figure shows the monthly Carhart (1997) 4-factor alpha for decile portfolios sorted on ETF-based
stock short ratio. The y-axis is the monthly alpha (in percentage), and the x-axis is the decile portfolio from
low to high. The sample runs from January 2002 to December 2013.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics: ETF characteristics
This table shows the characteristics of ETFs and their underlying stocks. Panel A reports the average,
the median, the 25th percentile, the 75th percentile, and the standard deviation of characteristics in the
pooled full sample. In Panel B, we sort ETFs into five portfolios for each month based on their short ratio.
Characteristics are first averaged within each portfolio-month and then averaged across months.
Panel A: Full Sample
Mean Median P25 P75 Std
Short Ratio(%) 4.08 0.90 0.31 2.72 10.32
Market Cap(mn) 1,386 182 46 737 3,712
12-month Return(%) 9.39 12.51 -2.87 23.53 24.98
Return Volatility(%) 5.47 4.65 3.24 6.74 3.06
Turnover Ratio(%) 2.70 0.93 0.56 1.83 6.62
Expense Ratio (%) 0.44 0.40 0.24 0.65 0.25
Days-to-Cover (doc) 2.1 0.9 0.3 2.3 3.4
Number of Stocks 417 211 88 467 558
Weighted-average characteristics of underlying stocks
Market Cap(mn) 68,506 44,971 4,909 121,042 698,08
Book-to-Market 0.48 0.07 0.02 0.3 1.04
Idiosyncratic Volatility(%) 1.50 1.35 1.07 1.75 0.59
Short Ratio(%) 3.86 3.22 2.20 5.09 2.16
Lending Supply(%) 23.53 24.60 22.88 26.92 6.42
Lending Utilization(%) 15.18 12.47 8.23 19.21 10.03
Lending Cost Score 1.11 1.05 1.01 1.15 0.16
Amihud Illiquidity(%) 0.32 0.04 0.01 0.15 1.05
Panel B: ETFs Sorted by Short Ratio
Low SR 2 3 4 High SR
Short Ratio(%) 0.23 0.85 1.80 3.67 18.98
Market Cap(mn) 501 1,301 1,549 1,286 2,728
12-month Return(%) 9.05 11.05 11.84 12.60 12.09
Return Volatility(%) 4.55 4.52 4.67 5.02 5.73
Turnover Ratio(%) 1.02 1.09 1.27 1.95 7.39
Expense Ratio(%) 0.44 0.35 0.38 0.42 0.47
Days-to-Cover (doc) 0.4 1.3 2.2 3.7 6.1
Number of Stocks 380 466 433 464 603
Weighted-average characteristics of underlying stocks
Market Cap(mn) 71,363 78,902 72,648 73,356 64,460
Book-to-Market 0.43 0.37 0.38 0.41 0.67
Idiosyncratic Volatility(%) 1.41 1.38 1.41 1.44 1.55
Short Ratio(%) 3.54 3.41 3.63 3.72 4.20
Lending Supply(%) 24.31 23.22 21.41 20.60 19.64
Lending Utilization(%) 13.04 15.18 15.52 15.78 18.88
Lending Cost Score 1.02 1.12 1.11 1.11 1.24
Amihud Illiquidity(%) 0.30 0.23 0.22 0.24 0.49
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Table 2: Stock-Level Descriptive Statistics
This table presents the summary statistics of our variables. Panel A reports the summary statistics for the
full sample. Panel B reports the pairwise rank correlation among our variables where they overlap. Panel
C reports the characteristics of the ETF-based Short Ratio (ETF sr) sorted portfolios. For each month,
we sort all stocks into quintiles based on their ETF-based stock short ratio. We first calculate the mean
of each variable for each quintile each month and then calculate the time-series average of cross-sectional
means. The overall sample period is from January 2002 to December 2013.
Panel A: Summary Statistics
Mean Median P25 P75 Std.
ETF sr 15.97% 14.18% 1.72% 24.31% 15.77%
SR 4.16% 2.76% 1.06% 5.53% 4.61%
IOR 58.51% 62.85% 34.95% 82.14% 28.91%
Mktcap 3507.8 571.4 177.3 2062.3 9760.6
LnBM -0.654 -0.578 -1.111 -0.130 0.815
MOM 0.124 0.060 -0.143 0.298 0.457
Turnover 0.79% 0.61% 0.31% 1.04% 0.71%
IVOL 0.025 0.020 0.013 0.030 0.017
DCBS 1.499 1.005 1.001 1.160 1.285
SAF 85.9 28.2 22.5 36.1 229.7
Supply 13.80% 14.23% 6.55% 20.10% 8.29%
Utilization 34.12% 16.10% 5.68% 39.38% 54.30%
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Table 2 Continued
Panel B: Rank Correlations
ETF sr SR IO LnME LnBM MOM Turnover IVOL DCBS Ln(SAF) Supply Utilization
ETF sr 1.000
SR 0.366 1.000
IO 0.229 0.475 1.000
LnME 0.129 0.351 0.564 1.000
LnBM -0.144 -0.242 -0.138 -0.293 1.000
MOM 0.057 0.005 0.110 0.136 0.009 1.000
Turnover 0.165 0.666 0.581 0.464 -0.255 0.036 1.000
IVOL -0.047 -0.008 -0.262 -0.506 0.044 -0.169 0.030 1.000
DCBS -0.094 0.020 -0.384 -0.352 -0.044 -0.181 -0.041 0.344 1.000
Ln(SAF) 0.122 0.217 -0.154 -0.275 -0.035 -0.122 0.096 0.299 0.467 1.000
Supply 0.231 0.468 0.789 0.602 -0.076 0.147 0.522 -0.344 -0.442 -0.247 1.000
Utilization 0.296 0.678 0.086 0.060 -0.214 -0.083 0.390 0.158 0.339 0.363 -0.014 1.000
Panel C: Summary Statistics of ETF-based SR sorted Quintile Portfolios
Portfolio # of stocks ETF sr SR IO Mktcap lnBM MOM Turnover IVOL DCBS SAF Supply Utilization
0 623 0.37% 1.93% 37.36% 1192.1 -0.437 0.122 0.56% 0.032 1.881 107.2 7.96% 59.13%
1 622 3.63% 3.30% 58.97% 3431.2 -0.668 0.103 0.84% 0.023 1.497 83.0 12.96% 28.76%
2 622 14.48% 4.48% 71.40% 9308.0 -0.701 0.116 0.89% 0.018 1.205 47.7 19.15% 22.90%
3 623 22.42% 5.91% 70.72% 1973.6 -0.715 0.126 0.91% 0.022 1.253 69.0 18.25% 36.51%
4 623 36.77% 5.06% 56.91% 1163.7 -0.826 0.167 0.76% 0.026 1.539 118.0 12.64% 44.28%
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Table 3: Cross-Sectional Determinants of ETF Short Ratio
This table reports the results from the Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression of the monthly ETF short
interest ratio on ETF characteristics and constituent stocks’ characteristics. ETF Return and ETF
Return Vol are the 12-month mean and volatility of the ETF monthly return. Stock-level characteristics
are weighted-averaged within an ETF’s quarterly holdings. Stock IVol is stock idiosyncratic volatilities
per Ang(2006). Stock short ratio is the mid-month open short interests divided by shares outstanding.
Short Supply is the total lendable shares from Markit divided by shares outstanding. Lending fee is
a score from 1 to 10 created by Markit to capture the difficulty of shorting a stock. Illiquidity is the
Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure. ETF premium is calculated as Price/NAV − 1.The standard errors
are adjsuted using Newey-West. ***, **, and * represent significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ETF Turnover 1.476∗∗∗ 1.463∗∗∗ 1.464∗∗∗ 1.461∗∗∗ 1.465∗∗∗ 1.461∗∗∗ 1.443∗∗∗
(15.29) (15.42) (15.39) (15.40) (15.35) (15.36) (15.56)
ETF Ln(ME) 0.000566 0.000573 0.000393 0.000759 0.000551 0.000541 0.000543
(0.91) (1.01) (0.68) (1.34) (0.95) (0.92) (0.95)
ETF Return -0.0218 -0.0174 -0.0155 -0.0129 -0.0157 -0.0166 -0.0222
(-1.26) (-1.17) (-0.89) (-0.82) (-1.02) (-0.99) (-1.30)
ETF Return Vol 0.0398 -0.181 -0.215 -0.115 -0.134 -0.105 -0.0485
(0.23) (-1.22) (-1.41) (-0.80) (-0.91) (-0.71) (-0.34)
ETF Expense Ratio 0.200 0.860 0.360 0.621 0.750 0.626 0.667
(0.35) (1.47) (0.63) (1.13) (1.28) (1.13) (1.44)
ETF Price/NAV Premium 1.377∗∗ 1.592∗∗ 1.481∗∗ 1.484∗∗ 1.338∗∗ 1.504∗∗ 1.436∗∗
(2.17) (2.23) (2.18) (2.20) (2.02) (2.17) (2.15)
ETF Lending Fee Score -0.00730∗∗∗ -0.00772∗∗∗ -0.00761∗∗∗ -0.00747∗∗∗ -0.00758∗∗∗ -0.00744∗∗∗ -0.00771∗∗∗
(-4.79) (-5.20) (-5.05) (-5.07) (-5.10) (-4.94) (-5.37)
Stock Return IVol 1.584∗∗ 3.551∗∗∗ 4.539∗∗∗ 3.766∗∗∗ 2.839∗∗∗ 3.557∗∗∗ 2.296∗∗∗
(2.34) (5.23) (6.77) (6.87) (5.40) (5.97) (4.12)
Stock Illiquidity 1.921∗∗∗
(4.42)
Stock Short Ratio 0.0322
(0.27)
Stock Institutional Ownership -0.0694∗∗∗
(-3.28)
Stock Lending Supply -0.127∗
(-1.78)
Stock Lending Utilization 0.0808∗∗∗
(5.70)
Stock Lending Fee Score 0.0124∗∗∗ -0.00309
(3.77) (-0.96)
Top Decile Stock Lending Fee 0.0111∗∗∗
(7.86)
Stock Ln(ME) -0.00140∗ 0.000775 -0.00105 -0.000967 0.00197∗∗ -0.000123 -0.000172
(-1.95) (0.87) (-1.47) (-1.35) (2.08) (-0.16) (-0.21)
Stock BM -0.00458∗ 0.00271 -0.00152 0.00140 0.00164 0.0000639 -0.000419
(-1.88) (1.60) (-0.70) (0.81) (0.95) (0.03) (-0.21)
R2 0.471 0.461 0.462 0.460 0.461 0.461 0.471
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Table 4: ETF-Based Short Ratio Before and After Regulation SHO Pilot Program
This table reports the stock-level ETF-based short ratio (%) in a difference-in-differences specification using
the Regulation SHO’s Pilot Program as a natural experiment. Pilot stocks are those that are chosen in the
Regulation SHO Pilot Program and control stocks are those that are in Russell 3000 index but not the
Pilot Program. The observations are made at the stock-month level, and we include 12 months before and
12 months after the inception of the Pilot Program (May 2005). Post is a dummy variable that equals one
when the short ratio is observed after May 2005. Control variables include natural logarithm of the direct
short ratio of the stock, the market capitalization of the stock, the turnover ratio of the stock, the past
12-month return of the stock, and the idiosyncratic volatility of the stock’s returns . All standard errors are
clustered at the stock level. ***, **, and * represent significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
Pilot Stocks * Pilot Program Period -0.884∗∗∗ -0.793∗∗ -0.827∗∗∗
(-2.72) (-2.47) (-2.64)
Pilot Program Period 1.123∗∗∗ 1.257∗∗∗
(5.42) (6.04)
Pilot Stocks -0.257 0.480
(-0.66) (1.47)
Stock Short Ratio 0.486∗∗∗ 0.455∗∗∗
(11.37) (11.89)
Log(Stock Market Cap) -2.474∗∗∗ 2.887∗∗∗
(-21.23) (6.11)
Turnover Ratio -0.0253∗∗ 0.00131
(-1.99) (0.17)
Stock Past Returns 0.0322∗∗∗ -0.0112∗∗∗
(9.65) (-3.21)
Stock IVol 0.216 0.0193
(1.45) (0.32)
Observations 69727 69727 69727
Adjusted R2 0.002 0.144 0.746
Stock Fixed-Effects N N Y
Time Fixed-Effects N N Y52
Table 5: ETF Shares Growth and Shorting Demand
This table reports the results of panel regressions on ETF shares growth with ETF fixed-effects. The
dependent variable, ETF shares growth, is defined as ∆Sharest/Sharest−1. All independent variables are
measured at month t. ETF Short Ratio is the short interest of ETF scaled by the ETF’s shares outstanding.
Stock Lending Utilization is the ratio of shares borrowed to shares made available by Markit lenders. DCBS
is a score from 1 to 10 created by Markit capturing the cost of borrowing the stock. Lending supply is
the number of shares made available to lend by Markit lenders, scaled by shares outstanding. Standard
errors are clustered at the month level. ***, **, and * represent significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%,
respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ETF Short Ratio 0.0745∗∗
(2.40)
Stock Lending Utilization 0.140∗∗∗
(4.54)
Stock Lending Fee Score 0.0229
(1.51)
Stock Lending Supply -0.267∗∗∗
(-6.82)
ETF Ln(ME) -0.00509 0.000620 -0.00375 0.00528
(-1.59) (0.22) (-1.46) (1.61)
ETF Lending Fee Score 0.00751∗∗∗ 0.00763∗∗∗ 0.00728∗∗∗ 0.00768∗∗∗
(5.09) (5.18) (3.46) (5.30)
ETF Turnover 0.816∗∗∗ 0.769∗∗∗ 0.784∗∗∗ 0.795∗∗∗
(8.66) (8.45) (4.93) (8.65)
ETF Expense Ratio -0.733 -1.739 -1.028 -2.867∗∗
(-0.55) (-1.37) (-0.62) (-2.18)
ETF Return 0.0137 0.0200 0.0159 0.00678
(1.07) (1.57) (1.63) (0.52)
ETF Return Vol -0.298∗∗∗ -0.181∗∗ -0.247∗∗ -0.224∗∗∗
(-3.72) (-2.28) (-2.60) (-2.80)
Stock Return IVol 0.769 0.702 0.597 1.336∗∗∗
(1.38) (1.20) (1.38) (2.72)
Stock Ln(ME) 0.000730 0.00296 0.000624 0.00442
(0.22) (0.92) (0.15) (1.39)
Stock BM -0.00282 -0.00132 -0.00274 -0.00249
(-1.06) (-0.48) (-0.94) (-0.95)
Observations 15227 15227 15227 15227
R2 0.098 0.102 0.097 0.108
ETF Fixed-Effects Y Y Y Y
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Table 6: ETF Portfolio Returns Sorted on ETF Short Ratio
This table reports the monthly average returns, Fama and French (1993) 3-factor alpha, and Fama and
French (1993) and Carhart (1997) 4-factor alpha for each of the five quintile portfolios formed by ETF
funds, as well as the long-short portfolio (Low-High). At the end of each month, all ETF funds are sorted
into quintiles based on their mid-month reported short ratio, and a long-short portfolio is formed by buying
the lowest quintile and shorting the highest quintile portfolio. Portfolio returns are computed over the next
month. Panel A reports results for equally weighted portfolios, and Panel B shows results for value-weighted
portfolios. The sample runs from January 2002 to December 2013.
Panel A: Equal-weighted Quintile Portfolio Returns and Alphas
Mean t-stat FF(93) t-stat Carhart(97) t-stat
Low 0.70 1.77 0.01 0.21 0.01 0.12
2 0.68 1.77 0.01 0.14 0.00 0.05
3 0.69 1.72 -0.01 -0.16 -0.02 -0.37
4 0.62 1.47 -0.12 -1.75 -0.13 -1.96
High 0.58 1.25 -0.23 -2.97 -0.24 -3.11
Low - High 0.11 1.08 0.24 3.26 0.24 3.31
Panel B: Value-weighted Quintile Portfolio Returns and Alphas
Mean t-stat FF(93) t-stat Carhart(97) t-stat
Low 0.77 2.09 0.13 1.97 0.13 1.93
2 0.64 1.69 -0.03 -0.75 -0.03 -0.81
3 0.62 1.65 -0.04 -0.92 -0.05 -1.05
4 0.68 1.68 -0.03 -0.38 -0.04 -0.54
High 0.61 1.59 -0.07 -2.63 -0.07 -2.90
Low - High 0.16 2.16 0.20 2.92 0.20 2.95
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Table 7: Portfolio Returns Sorted on ETF-based Stock SR
This table reports the monthly average returns, Fama and French (1993) 3-factor alpha, and Fama and
French (1993) and Carhart (1997) 4-factor alpha for each of the 10 decile portfolios, as well as the long-short
portfolio (Low-High). At the end of each month, all stocks are sorted into deciles based on their ETF-based
stock short ratio (ETF sr) and a long-short portfolio is formed by buying the lowest decile and shorting the
highest decile portfolio. Portfolio returns are computed over the next month. Panel A reports results for
equally weighted portfolios and Panel B shows results for value-weighted portfolios. The sample runs from
January 2002 to December 2013.
Panel A: Equal-weighted Decile Portfolio Returns and Alphas
Mean t-stat FF(93) t-stat Carhart(97) t-stat
Low 1.58 2.97 0.62 1.99 0.70 2.30
2 1.22 2.30 0.21 0.91 0.28 1.30
3 1.07 2.11 0.10 0.53 0.16 0.89
4 0.95 1.94 -0.01 -0.09 0.03 0.20
5 1.02 2.28 0.13 1.11 0.18 1.76
6 1.13 2.32 0.10 0.97 0.13 1.32
7 1.09 2.12 -0.01 -0.07 0.02 0.24
8 1.00 1.84 -0.14 -1.16 -0.10 -0.93
9 1.00 1.80 -0.14 -0.85 -0.08 -0.56
High 0.83 1.54 -0.27 -1.69 -0.24 -1.51
Low - High 0.76 2.55 0.90 3.05 0.94 3.21
Panel B: Value-weighted Decile Portfolio Returns and Alphas
Mean t-stat FF(93) t-stat Carhart(97) t-stat
Low 0.98 2.51 0.46 1.68 0.42 1.56
2 0.72 1.71 0.09 0.57 0.11 0.65
3 0.66 1.43 -0.02 -0.10 -0.01 -0.06
4 0.63 1.53 0.04 0.33 0.03 0.31
5 0.68 1.91 0.19 2.31 0.20 2.47
6 0.78 1.90 0.13 0.98 0.13 1.02
7 0.72 1.61 -0.02 -0.11 -0.06 -0.44
8 0.67 1.41 -0.14 -0.86 -0.18 -1.22
9 0.76 1.52 -0.09 -0.54 -0.11 -0.62
High 0.56 1.09 -0.32 -1.87 -0.35 -2.03
Low - High 0.42 1.14 0.78 2.51 0.77 2.47
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Table 8: Two-way sorts on Stock Short Ratio and ETF-based Short Ratio
This table reports monthly Carhart (1997) 4-factor alphas (in percentages) sorted on stock’s short ratio and
ETF-based stock short ratios (ETF sr). At the end of each month, all the stocks are sorted into terciles
based on stock’s short ratio, and within each tercile the stocks are further sorted into quintiles based on
their ETF-based short ratios. Panel A reports equal-weighted returns and panel B for value-weighted
return. The sample runs from January 2002 to December 2013.
Panel A: Equal-weighted Portfolio
ETF-based Stock Short ratio
Stock SR Low 2 3 4 High Low-High
Low 1.10 0.69 0.54 0.31 0.32 0.77
(3.52) (2.62) (2.50) (1.97) (1.99) (2.60)
2 -0.09 0.11 0.34 0.15 0.02 -0.11
(-0.43) (0.95) (3.17) (1.07) (0.14) (-0.48)
High -0.47 -0.11 -0.14 -0.50 -0.65 0.18
(-2.55) (-1.04) (-1.34) (-4.21) (-3.75) (0.88)
Low SR Sample- 0.60
High SR Sample (2.03)
Panel B: Value-weighted Portfolio
ETF-based Stock Short ratio
Stock SR Low 2 3 4 High Low-High
Low 0.92 0.23 0.24 0.03 0.09 0.83
(3.23) (1.12) (1.14) (0.26) (0.43) (2.32)
2 0.00 0.13 0.29 -0.01 0.11 -0.11
(0.01) (1.21) (2.11) (-0.08) (0.61) (-0.48)
High -0.35 -0.19 -0.09 -0.39 -0.50 0.15
(-2.21) (-1.51) (-0.72) (-3.06) (-2.88) (0.66)
Low SR Sample- 0.68
High SR Sample (1.74)
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Table 9: Two-way sorts on Short-Sale Constraints and ETF-based Short Ratio
This table reports monthly Carhart (1997) 4-factor alphas (in percentages) sorted on proxies of short-sales
constraints and ETF-based stock short ratios (ETF sr). At the end of each month, all the stocks are sorted
into terciles based on a proxy for short-sale constraints, and within each tercile the stocks are further sorted
into quintiles based on their ETF-based short ratios. Returns are equally weighted within each portfolio.
We use lendable supply, institutional ownership, lending fee, idiosyncratic volatility, stock turnover, and
Amihud (2002) illiquidity as proxy for short-sale constraints in Panels A, B, C, D, E, and F, respectively.
The overall sample runs from January 2002 to December 2013. The lending fee and lendable supply sample
is from January 2004 to December 2013.
Panel A: Lendable Supply and ETF-based SR
ETF-based Stock Short ratio
Lendable Supply Low 2 3 4 High Low-High
Low 0.43 0.34 -0.03 -0.21 -0.31 0.73
(1.22) (1.01) (-0.10) (-1.12) (-1.30) (1.98)
2 0.40 0.05 0.26 0.06 0.14 0.27
(2.33) (0.42) (2.51) (0.48) (0.90) (1.10)
High 0.05 -0.02 0.15 -0.07 -0.17 0.22
(0.35) (-0.24) (1.48) (-0.75) (-1.67) (1.31)
Low Supply Sample - 0.52
High Supply Sample (1.77)
Panel B: Inst.Ownership and ETF-based SR
ETF-based Stock Short ratio
Inst. Ownership Low 2 3 4 High Low-High
Low 0.81 0.44 -0.02 -0.21 -0.39 1.20
(2.51) (1.42) (-0.07) (-1.46) (-2.10) (3.59)
2 0.44 0.12 0.33 0.07 0.14 0.29
(2.26) (1.01) (3.15) (0.55) (0.81) (1.44)
High 0.04 0.04 0.12 -0.11 -0.21 0.25
(0.25) (0.42) (1.10) (-1.03) (-1.50) (1.51)
Low IO Sample - 0.95
High IO Sample (3.18)
Panel C: Lending fee and ETF-based SR
ETF-based Stock Short ratio
Lending Fee Low 2 3 4 5 Low-High
Low 0.50 0.27 0.15 0.12 0.13 0.40
(2.33) (1.80) (2.18) (1.56) (1.02) (1.77)
High 0.24 -0.74 -1.41 -1.02 -1.47 1.76
(0.50) (-1.78) (-4.35) (-3.85) (-4.25) (3.94)
High Fee Sample - 1.36
Low Fee Sample (4.03)
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Table 9 Continued
Panel D: Idiosyncratic Vol. and ETF-based SR
ETF-based Stock Short ratio
Idiosyncratic Vol Low 2 3 4 High Low-High
Low 0.40 0.25 0.23 0.10 0.09 0.30
(3.57) (2.79) (2.76) (0.90) (0.73) (2.02)
2 0.36 0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.04 0.32
(2.02) (0.11) (-0.02) (-0.12) (0.27) (1.54)
High 0.59 0.18 -0.02 -0.17 -0.40 0.99
(1.55) (0.52) (-0.11) (-0.99) (-1.84) (2.75)
High IVOL Sample - 0.69
Low IVOL Sample (2.06)
Panel E: Stock Turnover and ETF-based SR
ETF-based Stock Short ratio
Turnover Low 2 3 4 5 Low-High
Low 1.00 0.59 0.25 0.02 0.02 0.98
(2.99) (2.32) (1.03) (0.10) (0.08) (2.51)
2 0.55 0.10 0.25 0.04 -0.09 0.65
(2.35) (0.87) (2.21) (0.33) (-0.56) (2.72)
High -0.47 -0.10 -0.05 -0.09 -0.45 -0.03
(-1.89) (-0.72) (-0.43) (-0.64) (-2.01) (-0.11)
Low Turnover Sample- 1.01
High Turnover Sample (2.56)
Panel F: Amihud Illiquidity and ETF-based SR
ETF-based Stock Short ratio
Illiquidity Low 2 3 4 5 Low-High
Low 0.10 0.00 0.18 0.17 -0.08 0.18
(0.76) (-0.04) (2.06) (2.27) (-0.76) (1.33)
2 -0.18 0.01 0.10 -0.22 -0.13 -0.05
(-1.27) (0.05) (0.82) (-1.49) (-0.80) (-0.28)
High 0.81 0.58 0.35 0.12 -0.09 0.90
(2.40) (1.75) (1.15) (0.60) (-0.45) (2.64)
High Illiquidity Sample - 0.71
Low Illiquidity Sample (2.10)
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Table 10: Fama-MacBeth Regression: Baseline
This table reports the results from the Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression of monthly stock returns on
ETF-based short ratio (ETF sr). ETF sr2 is the dollar value of short interests on the stock via ETFs over
stock’s market capitalization. Size (LnME) is the natural log of a firm’s market capitalization at the end
of the June of each year. Book-to-market (LnBM) is the natural log of the book-to-market ratio. The
cases with negative book value are deleted. Momentum (MOM) is defined as the cumulative returns from
month t-12 to t-2. The short term reversal measure (REV) is the lagged monthly return. Institutional
ownership (IO) is the sum of shares held by institutions from 13F filings in each quarter divided by the
total shares outstanding. IVOL is the idiosyncratic volatility, calculated following Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and
Zhang (2006). All t-statistics are Newey-West adjusted with twelve lags to control for heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation. ***, **, and * represent significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ETF sr -0.0219** -0.0125** -0.0124***
(-2.52) (-2.50) (-2.69)
ETF sr2 -0.6826**
(-2.57)
LnME -0.0007 -0.0012** -0.0013**
(-0.94) (-2.34) (-2.21)
LnBM 0.0012 0.0009 0.0009
(1.31) (0.95) (0.85)
REV -0.0181*** -0.0188*** -0.0188***
(-3.49) (-3.48) (-3.41)
MOM -0.0055 -0.0043 -0.0044
(-0.81) (-0.72) (-0.76)
IO 0.0049* 0.0064
(1.67) (1.61)
IVOL -0.0498 -0.0477
(-0.60) (-0.58)
Constant 0.0145** 0.0146 0.0165** 0.0167**
(2.14) (1.45) (2.19) (2.19)
Ave.R-sq 0.005 0.029 0.039 0.040
N.of Obs. 432063 432063 432062 430407
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Table 11: Fama-MacBeth Regression: Controlling for Stock-level Shorting Vari-
ables
This table reports the results from the Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression of monthly stock returns on
ETF-based short ratios (ETF sr) while controlling for variables related to stock lending. Size (LnME) is the
natural log of a firm’s market capitalization at the end of the June of each year. Book-to-market (LnBM)
is the natural log of the book-to-market ratio. The cases with negative book value are deleted. Momentum
(MOM) is defined as the cumulative returns from month t-12 to t-2. The short term reversal measure
(REV) is the lagged monthly return. Institutional ownership (IO) is the sum of shares held by institutions
from 13F filings in each quarter divided by the total shares outstanding. IVOL is the idiosyncratic volatility,
calculated following Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006). Short interest ratio (SR) is the number of
shares shorted over total shares outstanding. DCBS is a score from 1 to 10 created by Markit using their
proprietary information and is intended to capture the cost of borrowing the stock. SIO is the short interest
ratio (SR) divided by institutional ownership. Lendable shares (supply) is the shares held and made
available to lend by Markit lenders divided by total shares outstanding. Utilization is the ratio of shares
borrowed to shares made available by Markit lenders. All t-statistics are Newey-West adjusted with twelve
lags to control for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. ***, **, and * represent significance levels of 1%,
5%, and 10%, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ETF sr -0.0097** -0.0114*** -0.0123** -0.0094** -0.0115*** -0.0100**
(-2.03) (-2.66) (-2.10) (-2.08) (-2.77) (-2.14)
LnME -0.0014*** -0.0012** -0.0010* -0.0012** -0.0011** -0.0013**
(-2.71) (-2.32) (-1.78) (-2.40) (-2.17) (-2.45)
LnBM 0.0012 0.0002 0.0005 0.0009 0.0011 0.0006
(1.30) (0.18) (0.53) (1.05) (1.28) (0.67)
REV -0.0243*** -0.0187*** -0.0189*** -0.0244*** -0.0169*** -0.0232***
(-5.05) (-3.20) (-3.26) (-5.23) (-3.49) (-4.62)
MOM -0.0056 -0.0037 -0.0027 -0.0056 -0.0039 -0.0042
(-0.96) (-0.58) (-0.41) (-0.95) (-0.69) (-0.69)
IO 0.0087*** 0.0028 0.0064** 0.0037 0.0094** 0.0056**
(2.92) (1.07) (2.09) (1.36) (2.18) (2.06)
IVOL 0.0113 -0.0744 -0.0542 0.0329 -0.0273 -0.0351
(0.14) (-1.34) (-0.84) (0.40) (-0.28) (-0.60)
SR -0.0445*** -0.0253**
(-4.55) (-2.56)
DCBS -0.0031*** -0.0023***
(-5.62) (-3.85)
Utilization -0.0056***
(-2.93)
SIO -0.0247***
(-7.68)
Supply -0.0148**
(-2.35)
Constant 0.0163** 0.0203*** 0.0130* 0.0179** 0.0153** 0.0191**
(2.17) (2.79) (1.68) (2.40) (2.14) (2.54)
Ave.R-sq 0.043 0.042 0.042 0.044 0.040 0.045
N.of Obs. 382372 385102 362249 382230 420203 345635
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Table 12: Fama-MacBeth Regression: Interaction between ETF-based SR and
Short-Sale Constraint Measures
This table reports the results from the Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression of monthly stock returns on
ETF-based stock short ratios (ETF sr) and its interaction with several dummies that indicate binding
short-sale constraints. LowIO (Lowsupply) is a dummy equal to one when the stock is in the bottom quintile
of institutional ownership ratio (lendable supply) in the cross-section. Highutil (Highfee) is a dummy equal
to one when the stock is in the top quintile of utilization (lending fees) in the cross-section. Lowturn is a
dummy equal to one when the stock is in the bottom quintile of past 12-month average turnover in the
cross-section. Noput is a dummy equal to one when the stock has no exchange-traded put option. Other
control variables are the same as in the previous tables. All t-statistics are Newey and West (1987) adjusted
with twelve lags to control for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. ***, **, and * represent significance
levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ETFsr -0.0055 -0.0086* -0.0073 -0.0073 -0.0071 -0.0001
(-1.12) (-1.68) (-1.35) (-1.61) (-1.30) (-0.02)
ETFsr lowIO -0.0202***
(-2.67)
LowIO -0.0036
(-1.64)
ETFsr lowsupply -0.0041
(-1.04)
Lowsupply -0.0010
(-0.84)
ETFsr highutil -0.0073*
(-1.75)
Highutil -0.0008
(-0.46)
ETFsr highfee -0.0176***
(-3.26)
Highfee -0.0026
(-1.18)
ETFsr lowturn -0.0082*
(-1.72)
Lowturn -0.0024
(-1.07)
ETFsr Noput -0.0137**
(-2.19)
Noput -0.0018
(-0.79)
SR -0.0383*** -0.0463*** -0.0411*** -0.0325*** -0.0583*** -0.0622***
(-4.07) (-4.66) (-3.68) (-3.48) (-4.91) (-5.09)
LnME -0.0011** -0.0014*** -0.0013** -0.0014*** -0.0016*** -0.0018***
(-2.20) (-2.66) (-2.23) (-2.72) (-2.94) (-3.01)
LnBM 0.0012 0.0011 0.0005 0.0010 0.0012 0.0012
(1.33) (1.28) (0.56) (1.07) (1.33) (1.43)
REV -0.0243*** -0.0244*** -0.0200*** -0.0251*** -0.0262*** -0.0258***
(-5.04) (-5.08) (-3.82) (-5.18) (-4.91) (-4.84)
MOM -0.0057 -0.0057 -0.0036 -0.0058 -0.0044 -0.0045
(-0.96) (-0.96) (-0.54) (-0.98) (-0.82) (-0.82)
IVOL 0.0096 0.0145 -0.0696 0.0231 -0.0167 0.0065**
(0.12) (0.18) (-1.12) (0.29) (-0.21) (2.38)
IO 0.0078*** 0.0109*** 0.0063** 0.0058* -0.0184
(2.65) (3.60) (2.37) (1.78) (-0.23)
Constant 0.0201** 0.0171** 0.0120 0.0172** 0.0192** 0.0202***
(2.42) (2.18) (1.44) (2.24) (2.56) (2.80)
Ave.R-sq 0.043 0.044 0.042 0.045 0.050 0.050
N.of Obs. 382372 382372 325433 382372 399047 399047
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Table 13: Anomaly Returns Conditional on ETF Ownership
This table reports monthly excess returns (in percentages) and Carhart (1997) 4-factor alphas (in
percentages) for 10 well-studied anomalies. For each month, we sort stocks with DCBS scores greater
than two into two groups based on ETF ownership. We then further sort stocks into terciles based on
anomaly characteristics. The long-short anomaly return of the category is given by the difference between
the returns of the extreme portfolios. Panel A reports the monthly long-short returns for each anomaly and
ETF ownership category. Panel B reports the corresponding Carhart (1997) 4-factor alphas. The sample
runs from January 2004 to December 2013.
Lending Fees Anomalies
ETF Ownership Bucket DCBS SAF B/M Accurals NOA AG CI LT REV CS GP ROA MOM
Panel A: Monthly Returns (%)
Low ETF Ownership 4.22 773.90 1.04 0.78 1.28 1.59 0.67 0.83 1.13 0.32 -0.08 -1.19
(t-stat) (62.36) (13.31) (1.94) (1.45) (2.32) (2.50) (1.24) (1.28) (1.93) (0.50) (-0.11) (-1.84)
High ETF Ownership 4.07 659.99 0.55 0.27 0.39 0.73 0.02 0.07 1.31 0.99 1.05 0.46
(t-stat) (72.07) (21.87) (1.36) (0.76) (0.90) (1.58) (0.05) (0.13) (3.22) (2.15) (2.13) (0.82)
Panel B: Cahart four-factor alpha (%)
Low ETF Ownership 1.12 0.74 1.40 1.50 0.65 0.60 1.28 0.49 -0.02 -1.17
(t-stat) (2.07) (1.38) (2.56) (2.34) (1.21) (0.93) (2.24) (0.79) (-0.02) (-2.15)
High ETF Ownership 0.50 0.19 0.45 0.63 -0.06 -0.06 1.41 1.07 1.19 0.47
(t-stat) (1.40) (0.55) (1.03) (1.57) (-0.14) (-0.14) (3.61) (2.37) (2.60) (1.15)
62
63
Appendices
Table A1: Cross-Sectional Determinants of ETF Short Ratio: Interaction with ETF
Turnover
This table reports the results from the Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression of monthly ETF short interest
ratios on ETF characteristics, constituent stocks’ characteristics, and the interaction between ETF turnover
and constituents’ characteristics. High Turnover is a dummy variable that equals one if the turnover ratio of
the ETF is above the cross-sectional median. We interact this dummy with the Stock illiquidity measure of
Amihud (2002), stock lending supply, stock lending utilization ratio, and the stock lending fee from Markit.
All t-statistics are Newey-West adjusted to control for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. ***, **, and
* represent significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ETF Ln(ME) 0.0132∗∗∗ 0.0136∗∗∗ 0.0129∗∗∗ 0.0133∗∗∗
(19.69) (19.06) (20.87) (20.40)
ETF Return -0.0361∗∗ -0.0386∗∗ -0.0416∗∗ -0.0538∗∗∗
(-2.12) (-2.25) (-2.58) (-2.75)
ETF Return Vol 0.819∗∗∗ 0.786∗∗∗ 0.742∗∗∗ 0.833∗∗∗
(5.77) (5.45) (5.24) (5.51)
High ETF Turnover 0.0433∗∗∗ 0.0213 0.00980∗∗ 0.0405∗∗∗
(29.17) (1.33) (2.52) (10.82)
Stock Illiquidity -1.087∗∗∗
(-4.48)
High ETF Turnover*Stock Illiquidity 6.076∗∗∗
(8.91)
Stock Lending Supply -0.00140
(-0.01)
High ETF Turnover*Stock Lending Supply -0.505∗
(-1.75)
Stock Lending Utilization -0.0587∗∗∗
(-4.10)
High ETF Turnover*Stock Lending Utilization 0.250∗∗∗
(13.06)
Stock Lending Fee 0.0212
(1.12)
High ETF Turnover*Stock Lending Fee 0.143∗∗∗
(5.60)
Stock Return IVol 1.027∗ 3.528∗∗∗ 2.013∗∗∗ 2.989∗∗∗
(1.86) (5.63) (3.88) (4.73)
Stock Ln(ME) and BM Y Y Y Y
Observations 16947 16947 16947 16947
R2 0.218 0.199 0.203 0.201
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Table A2: ETF Short Ratio Before and After Regulation SHO Pilot Program
This table reports the ETF-level short ratio (%) in a difference-in-differences specification using the
Regulation SHO’s Pilot Program as a natural experiment. An ETF is defined as a “treatment” fund if the
proportion of stocks (equal-weighted or value-weighted) that were included in the pilot program is ranked
in the top 10 among all ETFs. An ETF is defined as a “control” fund if it is ranked in the bottom 10.
The observations are made at the fund-month level, and we include, at most, 12 months before and 12
months after the inception of the Pilot Program (May 2005). Post is a dummy variable that equals one
when the short ratio is observed after May 2005. Control variables include natural logarithm of the market
capitalization of the ETF, the turnover ratio of the ETF, and the past 12-month return of the ETF. All
standard errors are clustered at the fund level. ***, **, and * represent significance levels of 1%, 5%, and
10%, respectively.
Equal-weighted Proportion Value-weighted Proportion
Average Pilot Proportion: Treatment ETFs=40.9% Treatment ETFs=45.9%
Control ETFs=17.4% Control ETFs=14.9%
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High Pilot Program Rate * Post -5.852∗∗∗ -2.716∗ -1.756∗ -1.218∗∗
(-2.95) (-1.79) (-1.92) (-2.04)
High Pilot Program Rate 2.496 0.484
(1.53) (0.68)
Post SHO Pilot Program 0.772 -1.179∗
(0.59) (-1.75)
log(ETF Market Cap) 0.523∗ -5.928∗∗∗ 1.728∗∗∗ -0.765
(1.95) (-3.42) (11.83) (-1.04)
ETF Turnover Ratio 0.211∗∗∗ 0.0790∗∗ 0.0894∗∗∗ 0.0564∗∗∗
(6.95) (2.38) (3.96) (2.84)
ETF Past Returns -0.0896∗ 0.0109 -0.152∗∗∗ 0.0411
(-1.69) (0.16) (-4.76) (1.46)
Observations 437 437 422 422
Adjusted R2 0.328 0.581 0.252 0.669
Fund-level Fixed-Effects N Y N Y
Time Fixed-Effects N Y N Y
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Table A3: Cross-Sectional Determinants of ETF-based Short Ratio
This table reports the results from the Fama-MacBeth (1973) regression of ETF-based Short Ratio on stock
characteristics. The dependent variable is ETF-based short ratio, constructed as detailed in the paper.
HFO is the quarterly hedge fund ownership, defined as the sum of shares held by all hedge funds reported
at each quarter divided by the total number of shares outstanding. Size (LnME) is the natural log of firm’s
market capitalization at the end of the June of each year. Book-to-market (LnBM) is the natural log of
the book-to-market ratio. The cases with negative book value are deleted. Momentum (MOM) is defined
as the cumulative returns from month t-12 to t-2. IO is the institutional ownership ratio. IVOL is the
idiosyncratic volatility following Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006). The sample period runs from 2002
to 2013.
(1)
HFO -0.0404***
(-2.83)
LnME -0.0171***
(-8.68)
LnBM -0.0266***
(-10.01)
MOM 0.0091**
(2.58)
IO 0.0893***
(10.99)
IVOL -0.7209***
(-8.38)
Turnover -0.0023
(-0.02)
Constant 0.2155***
(12.67)
Ave.R-sq 0.073
N.of Obs. 128753
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Table A4: Quintile Portfolio Returns Sorted on ETF-based Stock SR
This table reports the monthly average returns, Fama and French (1993) 3-factor alpha, and Fama and
French (1993) and Carhart (1997) 4-factor alpha for each of the quintile portfolios, as well as the long-short
portfolio (Low-High). At the end of each month, all stocks are sorted into quintiles based on their
ETF-based stock short ratio (ETF sr) and a long-short portfolio is formed by buying the lowest quintile
and shorting the highest quintile portfolio. Portfolio returns are computed over the next month. Panel A
reports results for equally weighted portfolios and Panel B shows results for value-weighted portfolios. The
sample runs from January 2002 to December 2013.
Panel A: Equal-weighted Quintile Portfolio Returns and Alphas
Mean t-stat FF(93) t-stat Carhart(97) t-stat
Low 1.40 2.71 0.42 1.67 0.49 2.06
2 1.01 2.04 0.04 0.25 0.09 0.60
3 1.08 2.32 0.11 1.20 0.15 1.84
4 1.04 1.98 -0.08 -0.80 -0.05 -0.52
High 0.92 1.69 -0.20 -1.35 -0.16 -1.12
Low - High 0.48 1.93 0.62 2.51 0.65 2.64
Panel B: Value-weighted Quintile Portfolio Returns and Alphas
Mean t-stat FF(93) t-stat Carhart(97) t-stat
Low 0.87 2.24 0.15 1.04 0.16 1.06
2 0.79 1.58 -0.01 -0.14 -0.02 -0.16
3 0.82 2.28 0.18 2.65 0.19 2.82
4 0.82 1.80 -0.07 -0.57 -0.11 -0.90
High 0.73 1.75 -0.20 -1.28 -0.21 -1.37
Low - High 0.14 0.87 0.35 1.86 0.37 1.84
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Table A5: Factor Loadings of ETF-based SR Portfolio
This table reports the factor loadings of the Carhart (1997) Four Factor model. MKTRF, SMB, HML, and
UMD stand for the market factor, size factor, value factor, and the momentum factor, respectively. Panel A
reports results for equal-weighted portfolios, and Panel B shows results for value-weighted portfolios. The
sample runs from January 2002 to December 2013.
Panel A: Equal-weighted alphas and factor loadings
Alpha MKTRF SMB HML UMD
Low 0.698 0.807 0.814 0.233 -0.216
(2.30) (10.01) (5.90) (1.79) (-3.28)
High -0.239 1.028 0.986 0.178 -0.098
(-1.51) (24.42) (13.68) (2.63) (-2.86)
Low - High 0.937 -0.221 -0.172 0.055 -0.118
(3.21) (-2.85) (-1.29) (0.44) (-1.86)
Panel B: Value-weighted alphas and factor loadings
Alpha MKTRF SMB HML UMD
Low 0.423 0.693 0.226 0.377 0.098
(1.56) (9.62) (1.83) (3.25) (1.67)
High -0.347 1.141 0.688 0.134 0.073
(-2.03) (25.18) (8.87) (1.84) (1.96)
Low - High 0.770 -0.448 -0.462 0.242 0.025
(2.47) (-5.40) (-3.25) (1.82) (0.38)
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Table A6: Robustness of Decile Portfolio Sorts
This table reports robustness tests for decile portfolio sorts based on ETF-based short ratio. In the first
set of robustness tests, we report the 4-factor alpha of gross return-weighted portfolio returns in which the
weights are 1 + the stock’s lagged monthly return, following Asparouhova, Bessembinder, and Kalcheva
(2013). The second set of robustness tests shows alphas using Fama-French 48 industry-adjusted return.
The third row shows the alpha using Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor augmented with the
Fama-French factors and the momentum factor. In the fourth set of tests, we report the alphas using the
Fama and French (2016) Five Factor model. In the fifth and sixth set of tests, we report the alphas using
the Stambaugh and Yuan (2015) Mispricing Factors model and the Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2015) Q-factor
model. In the seventh set of analyses, we exclude stocks with a price lower than $5. The eighth and ninth
set of analyses report alphas for stocks listed on NYSE-Amex and NASDAQ exchanges, respectively. In the
tenth panel, we skip a month between the moment at which ETF-based SR is constructed and the moment
at which we start measuring returns. In the last row, we first regress ETF-based SR on stock’s own SR
and form decile portfolios based on the residual ETF-based SR. The sample runs from January 2002 to
December 2013.
EW VW
Gross return-weighed portfolio 0.804 N/A
(2.76)
FF48 Industry-adjusted 0.900 0.640
(3.01) (1.97)
FF + Cahart + PS Factor 0.884 0.795
(3.01) (2.52)
FF five factor (2015) 1.144 0.846
(3.82) (2.56)
Mispricing factors (Stambaugh and Yuan 2017) 1.197 0.742
(4.13) (2.26)
Q-factor (Hou, Xue and Zhang 2015) 1.02 0.69
(3.45) (2.13)
Exclude Price<=$5 0.459 0.477
(2.39) (2.04)
NYSE-Amex 0.795 0.453
(2.68) (1.51)
NASDAQ 0.695 0.342
(2.00) (0.97)
Skip a month 0.775 0.801
(2.70) (2.51)
Residual ETF-based SR 0.750 0.406
(2.87) (1.64)
69
Table A7: Fama-MacBeth Regression: Additional Analysis
This table reports the results from the Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression of monthly stock returns on
ETF-based stock short ratios (ETF sr). In column (1) and (2), the sample period is from 2002 to 2007, and
from 2008 to 2013, respectively. The dependent variable is the Fama-French 48 industry-adjusted return in
column (3). The control variables are the same as in the previous tables. All t-statistics are Newey-West
adjusted with twelve lags to control for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. ***, **, and * represent
significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Subperiod Dep.Var is
2002-2007 2008-2013 Industry-adjusted return
ETF sr -0.0055 -0.0207* -0.0100**
(-0.73) (-1.95) (-2.19)
LnME -0.0003 -0.0024*** -0.0010*
(-0.40) (-3.21) (-1.97)
LnBM 0.0013 0.0004 0.0011*
(1.12) (0.27) (1.74)
Rev -0.0107* -0.0285*** -0.0193***
(-1.75) (-3.47) (-3.55)
MOM 0.0011 -0.0107 -0.0038
(0.27) (-0.86) (-0.76)
IO -0.0019 0.0130*** 0.0021
(-0.82) (4.06) (0.72)
IVOL -0.0725 -0.0226 -0.0423
(-0.53) (-0.22) (-0.49)
Constant 0.0096 0.0248*** 0.0076**
(0.78) (4.39) (1.99)
Ave.R-sq 0.039 0.039 0.033
N.of Obs. 238614 193448 426523
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Table A8: Fama-MacBeth Regression: 1- to 12-months ahead return predictability
This table reports the results from the Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression of monthly stock returns on
ETF-based stock short ratios (ETF sr). The dependent variables are monthly stock returns from 1 month
to 12 months ahead. The control variables are the same as in the previous tables. All t-statistics are
Newey-West adjusted with twelve lags to control for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. ***, **, and *
represent significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
1m 2m 3m 4m 5m 6m 7m 8m 9m 10m 11m 12m
ETF sr -0.0124*** -0.0126*** -0.0099** -0.0069 -0.0093* -0.0100** -0.0089** -0.0064 -0.0034 -0.0060 -0.0020 -0.0019
(-2.69) (-3.05) (-2.38) (-1.45) (-1.85) (-2.19) (-2.10) (-1.54) (-1.02) (-1.50) (-0.62) (-0.70)
LnME -0.0012** -0.0013*** -0.0010** -0.0009* -0.0008* -0.0010** -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0003
(-2.34) (-2.67) (-2.44) (-1.95) (-1.94) (-2.17) (-1.63) (-1.45) (-0.87) (-1.09) (-1.15) (-0.87)
LnBM 0.0009 0.0007 0.0008 0.0012 0.0009 0.0007 0.0009 0.0009 0.0011 0.0011 0.0010 0.0013
(0.95) (0.67) (0.86) (1.30) (1.00) (0.68) (0.92) (0.94) (1.23) (1.25) (1.19) (1.57)
REV -0.0188*** -0.0052 0.0038 -0.0073 0.0020 0.0015 -0.0006 0.0002 -0.0011 -0.0020 0.0078 0.0019
(-3.48) (-0.77) (0.61) (-1.35) (0.28) (0.20) (-0.11) (0.04) (-0.18) (-0.26) (1.37) (0.35)
MOM -0.0043 -0.0044 -0.0055 -0.0054 -0.0047 -0.0032 -0.0035 -0.0044 -0.0038 -0.0027 -0.0038 -0.0028
(-0.72) (-0.81) (-0.94) (-0.85) (-0.91) (-0.78) (-0.85) (-1.28) (-1.43) (-1.18) (-1.48) (-1.14)
IO 0.0049* 0.0049* 0.0058** 0.0051** 0.0047* 0.0049** 0.0056** 0.0052** 0.0045* 0.0052* 0.0055** 0.0055**
(1.67) (1.78) (2.35) (2.08) (1.91) (2.03) (2.38) (2.01) (1.72) (1.95) (2.02) (2.12)
IVOL -0.0498 -0.0496 -0.0031 0.0043 -0.0201 -0.0457 -0.0133 -0.0145 0.0272 -0.0021 -0.0042 0.0092
(-0.60) (-0.58) (-0.04) (0.05) (-0.29) (-0.74) (-0.24) (-0.22) (0.43) (-0.03) (-0.06) (0.12)
Constant 0.0165** 0.0170** 0.0139** 0.0133* 0.0132* 0.0138* 0.0118* 0.0111* 0.0094 0.0095 0.0095 0.0082
(2.19) (2.25) (2.02) (1.81) (1.93) (1.84) (1.81) (1.82) (1.33) (1.52) (1.46) (1.32)
Ave.R-sq 0.039 0.035 0.035 0.033 0.031 0.031 0.028 0.027 0.025 0.025 0.026 0.026
N.of Obs. 432062 429688 427259 424808 422364 419935 417505 415077 412662 410264 407884 405523
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